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RACIAL IMBALANCE, BLACK SEPARATISM, AND
PERMISSIBLE CLASSIFICATON BY RACE
Norman Vieira*
may fairly be said that the issue of state and federal power to
classify by race presents a constitutional dilemma "of the very
first importance." 1 Although this issue has been raised in many areas,
the problem of racial imbalance in public schools may best illustrate
the dilemma, for it involves a direct confrontation of two basic principles of equality: 2 that governmental action should be indifferent
to color3 and that the right to an education should be available to all
on even terms. The essential task is to reconcile those principles by
creating equal educational opportunities for disadvantaged minorities without imposing inappropriate burdens upon either the majority or segments of any minority, and without establishing a constitutional rule ·which might support some future inequality. It is a
task which is characteristic of important social problems both in its
ease of description and in its resistance to solution.
The legal challenge to racial imbalance in the schools was precipitated on May 17, 1954, when the Supreme Court declared that
"Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 4 The
Court's decision brought to an end the eroded doctrine that a state
could separate students in public schools solely because of their race
so long as "equal" facilities were provided. The demise of that doctrine also cast suspicion on fortuitous imbalance which is often
produced by imposing a neighborhood attendance plan on segregated
housing patterns. In succeeding years that suspicion developed into
a major constitutional and political debate. 5 While attention has con-
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• Professor of Law, University of Idaho. A.B. 1959, Columbia University; J.D.
1962, University of Chicago.-Ed.
1. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 58 (1962).
2. For a discussion of recent trends in resolving the more prevalent conflict between equality and other values, see Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal
in Title to the Legislative and Executive Bi-anches of the Government", 78 HARV.
L. REV. 143 (1964).
3. The "color-blindness" rule draws on the classic dissent of the first Justice
Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896), and on the separate opinions
of a number of other Justices. See, e.g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commrs.,
330 U.S. 552, 566 (1947) (Justice Rutledge dissenting).
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
5. The literature, nearly all of which concentrates on general policy issues rather
than on analysis of Supreme Court decisions, is voluminous. Bittker, The Case of
the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387
(1962); Carter, De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and Constitutional Questions Presented, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 502 (1965); Fiss, Racial Imbalance
in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARY. L. REY. 564 (1965);
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centrated mainly on the duty of the states to relieve racial imbalance,
the foremost issues concern permissible rather than mandatory remedial action. The controversy in all its forms has generated much unrest and has stimulated efforts to reduce the imbalance through a
variety of transfer and rezoning' plans which embody racial classifications.
Voluntary remedies classifying by race have frequently been upheld by state and lower federal courts. However, the cases have been
conspicuously unsuccessful in developing rules of law which would
not only sustain the action before the court, but adequately differentiate it from invidious uses of racial criteria. Some opinions have demanded corrective measures without considering the possibility
that those measures might themselves run afoul of the Constitution
if they are based on race, and might be totally ineffective if they
are not. 6 When courts have faced the issue of permissible means,
their response has usually been conclusory and sometimes disingenuous. One court ruled that a determination by the State Commissioner of Education that racial balance is essential to sound education was unreviewable, but did not explain why an administrative
judgment favoring segregation would stand in a different posture. 7
Other cases have said only that a school board need not "close its
eyes" to educational inequality, 8 and that it may consider race in
a "proper" attempt to eliminate imbalance.9 The contention that
corrective racial action is constitutionally proscribed has been dismissed as "unrealistic"10 and the "height of irony."11 Many courts
have been content to observe that the effects of de facto segregation
are similar to those of de jure segregation, and to rely on other
lower court cases which upheld remedial racial classification with
Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in
Public School Education, 13 UCLA L. R.Ev. 1147 (1966); Kaplan, Segregation Litiga•
tion and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U. L. R.Ev.
157 (1963); Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6 V1LL. L. R.Ev. 353 (1961);
Sedler, School Segregation in the North and West: Legal Aspects, 7 ST. Louis L.J. 228
(1963); Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 285 (1965).
6. E.g., Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 606 (1963).
7. In re Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 285 N.Y.S.2d 77, cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965). See also Olson v. Board of Educ., 250 F. Supp. 1000
(E.D.N.Y. 1966).
8. Morean v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97 (1964).
9. Offermann v. Nitkowski, 248 F. Supp. 129 (W.D.N.Y. 1965), afj'd, 378 F.2d (2d
Cir. 1967).
10. Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25 (D.N.J. 1964).
11. School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967), appeal
dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968).
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little more than the same observation.12 The result is a heavy accumulation of decisions permitting the use of racial criteria, but it is an
accumulation which takes the form of an inverted pyramid.13
The lower court opinions in this area, and the likelihood of classification by race in other areas, suggest a need for close review of
Supreme Court decisions involving state and federal programs drawn
along racial lines. This Article will examine those decisions to determine the constitutional permissibility of racial classification. It
will focus specifically on the correction of racial imbalance in the
schools since that continues to be the subject of great activity
and interest, 14 but a rule concerning classification by race would have
potential application to jobs, to housing, and even to current proposals for black separatism. The Article will begin with a discussion
of the School Segregation Cases15 which have been invoked both to
sustain and to invalidate corrective racial classification. It will then
review federal discrimination against Japanese-Americans and
against Indians, as well as the more obscure discrimination found in
immigration and naturalization laws. It will also consider, in some
detail, the paradoxical rules governing the discriminatory selection
of jurors and, in lesser detail, the cases dealing with domestic relations and racial designations. 16 A concluding section will discuss
black separatism and general policy matters relating to the correction
of imbalance in the schools. The Article assumes throughout that
the issue of racial classification, which has the capacity either to
remedy past injustices or to create new ones, cannot be resolved on a
result-oriented basis. Indeed, in the field of race relations, in which
action has ranged from assaults on Jim Crow practices to the drive
12. E.g., Guida v. Board of Educ., 26 Conn. Supp. 121, 213 A.2d 843 (Conn. Super.
1965); Morean v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97 (1964).
13. Opinions invalidating corrective measures that utilize race have been no more
satisfactory than those reaching the opposite conclusion. See Tometz v. Board of
Educ., No. 40292 (Ill. Sup. Ct., June 22, 1967), noted in 81 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1968),
rev'd on rehearing, 39 Ill.2d 593, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968).
14. Despite a new Negro emphasis on racial separation, a national opinion survey
recently showed that an overwhelming majority of blacks prefer integrated schooling
for their children. NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1969, at 20. See also R. MACK, OUR CHILDREN'S
BURDEN 455, 461 (1968).
15. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
16. Many of the familiar decisions invalidating classifications which deny benefits
or impose burdens because of color will be noted only briefly, and tangential questions of standing to litigate and of the applicability of anti-discrimination statutes
are omitted entirely. The latter points can affect the outcome of a given case, but
they do not speak to the issue of state power. A glance at lower court litigation will
show also that the standing requirement and the question whether corrective racial
classifications conform to anti-discrimination laws have not forestalled decision on
the constitutional merits.
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for separatism by some Negroes, a result-motivated approach could
answer at most the demands of this day only. But a "neutral" approach to the cases, it should be emphasized, is entirely compatible
with a conscientious governmental response to the needs of black
people and of disadvantaged members of other minorities.

I.

THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES AND THEIR PROGENY

One of the striking aspects of the school segregation controversy
is that it produced opinions of extraordinary surface simplicity. In
Brown v. Board of Education,17 for example, the Court took only
ten pages to dispose of the most important question that had
come before it in many years. Yet despite the simplicity of expression, or possibly because of it, there is widespread disagreement concerning the effect of that case on the issues raised by fortuitous racial
imbalance. Some ·writers have suggested that Brown prohibits official
use of racial factors, while others argue that the decision requires
affirmative state action, including classification by race, to eli~inate
imbalance.18 It was perhaps inevitable that an opinion which could
lend itself to such diverse interpretation would create uncertainty
among those who control the schools and frustration among those
who do not.
Brown v. Board of Education was a consolidation of class actions
brought on behalf of Negro minors who "had been denied admission
to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race." 19 In each case the lower court
had applied the "separate but equal" rule of Plessy v. Ferguson, 20
which held constitutional guarantees to be satisfied if the races were
provided substantially equal, though separate, facilities. On review,
the Supreme Court, using language which some commentators believe to be applicable to de facto segregation, prefaced its treatment
of Plessy with heavy emphasis on the importance of formal education:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.21
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. Both views are considered in Bittker, s1ipra note 5.
Fiss, supra note 5; Kaplan, supra note 5.
19. 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
20. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).

See

also note 46, infra;
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The opinion then set out succinctly its basic rationale that segregated
schools are inherently unequal and hence a denial of equal protection:
To separate [Negro school children] ... from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. . . .
" ... The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law;
for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects
the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of
law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental
development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system."
... Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is
rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine
of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal.22

Bolling v. Sharpe, 23 decided the same day, applied the Brown rationale to the District of Columbia. Since the equal protection clause
was inapplicable there, the Court relied on fifth amendment due
process:
Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any
proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process
Clause.24

Analysis of these cases should focus on three factors which
might be thought to have controlled or contributed importantly to
their outcome. One factor, stressed in Bolling but not in Brown,
is the unreasonableness of the classification. If the School Segregation Cases stand for the proposition that race is an inherently arbitrary classification, state action employing racial criteria would seem
to be invalid notwithstanding a purpose to alleviate imbalance. The
other two elements, closely interrelated, are racial separation and
the inherent inequality which separation was found to entail. If
either state-imposed separation or inequality of educational opportunity was the decisive factor in Brown, the decision could require
correction of imbalance arising out of the neighborhood school
22. 347 U.S. at 494-95.
23. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
24. 347 U.S. at 500.
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policy.25 It is submitted that analysis of Brown and its progeny in
these terms will reveal that the cases need not and should not be
construed to prohibit racial classification for the purpose of reducing
de facto segregation. But at the same time, those cases cannot be said
to approve such classification.

A. Racial Separation and Unequal Education
It should be clear at the outset that the School Segregation Cases
dealt specifically and exclusively with state-enforced segregation on
the basis of race.26 That fact, which the opinions carefully stressed,
is both elementary and crucial to an understanding of the scope of
the decisions. The cases did not hold that children have a constitutional right to attend an integrated school, although lower courts
have sometimes extended them that far. 27 Indeed, since Pierce v. Society of Sisters28 stated that laws requiring enrollment in public
schools interfere unconstitutionally "with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of [their] children,"29 Brown would seem to yield a principle of inclusion rather
than a right to the joint presence of any particular group.30 Nor
should the cases be read to proscribe fortuitous segregation resulting
from racially neutral classifications such as the neighborhood school
plan. Whatever the future may hold for that enigmatic issue, the
25. Since these elements relate primarily to the issue of constitutional duty, they
are discussed briefly and in the context of determining whether by indirection Brown
gives an affirmative answer to questions of constitutional permissibility.
26. Although the Court said in Brown that the adverse effects of segregation are
" 'greater when it has the sanction of law,' " the opinion was silent as to whether
any legal consequences attach to the "lesser" impact of unsanctioned segregation.
Some language in Brown implies that it is the separation of the races that supports
the finding of inequality that was fatal under the equal protection clause. But these
references to separation were qualified by the phrase "solely because of their race"
and so incorporate the element of racial classification.
27. See Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). In Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), which imposed an affirmative duty on de jure
segregated schools to convert to a unitary system, the Court e.xpressly rejected an
attempt to cast the issue in terms of whether the fourteenth amendment should be
read "as universally requiring 'compulsory integration' ••••" 391 U.S. at 437. See
notes 227-38, 262 infra and accompanying text concerning requirements for dismantling dual school systems.
28. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
29. 268 U.S. at 534-35.
30. Some doubt has been cast on the vitality of Pierce by the steady decline of
substantive due process concepts on which it was premised, although with respect to
noneconomic liberties the decline may be more apparent than real. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), for an illustration of what can be regarded as "incorporation" of due process freedoms into the Bill of Rights. At any rate, most states
would not make attendance in public schools mandatory, and the absence of such
compulsion, together with the freedom of families to relocate, could render any right
to attend integrated schools wholly illusory.
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question simply was not presented in Brown, and the Court made
no effort to reach it. This was implicit in the Court's request for
amici curiae briefs from states "requiring or permitting racial discrimination," a request which would have enlisted virtually every
state in the country if the quoted phrase had comprehended de facto
segregation. The restricted meaning of the decision was made explicit in the second Brown case,31 which advised lower courts,
in fashioning remedies for de jure segregation, to "consider problems
related to . . . revision of school districts and attendance areas into
compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the
public schools on a nonracial basis . . . .''32
I£ Brown did not address itself to racial separation in the abstract, neither did it deal with abstract inequality. In fact, the Court
has never held that the Constitution confers a right to share in the
best academic facilities operated by the government. Such an unrestrained guarantee would ignore the diverse nature of a state's
educational needs and the limitation of resources that makes it necessary to respond to those needs gradually. When Brown said that the
opportunity of education "must be made available to all on equal
terms," it could not have intended to foreclose temporary disparities
or even long-term educational differences which, like special classes
for the gifted or the underprivileged, are reasonably related to legitimate public interests.33
However, the Brown case has been construed to afford a qualified right to equal education. The thesis, as typically formulated, is
that substantial differences in educational opportunity are impermissible except upon a showing of "adequate justification."34 This
interpretation has the ironic effect of making the School Segregation
Cases applicable to schools that are not segregated, either fortuitously
31. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
32. 349 U.S. at 300-01 (emphasis added). Since segregated housing patterns were
notorious long before 1955, the call for "compact" attendance zones clearly reveals
the limited scope of Brown and Bolling. This limited scope is now favored by many
blacks because neighborhood schools are suitable to community control. See notes
299-301 infra and accompanying text.
The "Brown case" as used herein refers to Brown I unless otherwise indicated.
33. Every state operates academic programs to which access is limited, and many
federal programs-including national defense loans, "G.I." benefits and aid to elementary and secondary schools-involve educational inequalities which have not been
thought to be unconstitutional. Too often the effects of school policy fall disproportionately on Negroes and on others who are economically disadvantaged. In most state
universities, for example, the disproportions begin, but do not end, with requirements
for admission.
34. Fiss, supra note 5; Horowitz, supra note 5; cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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or by law, and to disparate treatment of members of the same race.311
More recent decisions may suggest the invalidity of disparities based
on inappropriate criteria, such as arbitrary geographical lines,36 but
it is unnecessary for purposes of this Article to examine such issues
in detail. Judicial endorsement of a qualified right to educational
equality would, in any event, provide no clear support for corrective
classification by race; it would mean only that in certain circumstances remedial action of some kind is obligatory. Such an undefined
mandate is not at all incompatible with the principle of color-blindness, a principle which might itself provide "adequate justification"
for rejecting many proposed remedies.37
B. Classification by Race

The remammg question is whether racial classification is permissible under the School Segregation Cases. Most commentators
35. The interpretation encounters other difficulties as well. First, the school cases
state only that segregation by race, which had always been invalid when it resulted
in substantially unequal treatment, is unconstitutional in the field of education because in that field "separate facilities are inherently unequal." Accordingly, the discussion of inequality need signify nothing more than that the condition on which
Plessy v. Fergnson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), upheld racial separation is unattainable.
Second, if the invalidation of segregation in the schools implies a general right to
educational equality, how is one to construe the per curiam decisions that followed
Brown? See notes 42-45 infra. Would they not give rise to a right of equal opportunity to enjoy parks, beaches and transportation facilities? Conceivably, the involuntariness of school attendance and Brown's emphasis on the importance of
education might provide a basis for distinguishing. But see note 53 infra. Whether
or not that is so, the proposed thesis would resurrect the equality test of the Plessy
era. For a description of the sorry history of that test see Leflar and Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARV. L. REV. 377, 392-402 (1954). While the new
approach, unlike the old, would have a morally defensible objective, it would operate
with the same unrefined tools for measuring equality and would introduce additional
imponderables that bear on the question of justification.
36. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). But see Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.
Supp. 327 (N.D. lll. 1968), afj'd sub nom. Mcinnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). For
a discussion of the equal education thesis see A. \VISE, RICH SCHOOLS, PooR SCHOOLS:
THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1968); for a critical view see
Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence
Undefined, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 583 (1968).
37. Because of its imprecision, or what some may regard as "creative ambiguity,"
the Brown opinion is susceptible to highly simplistic expansion. It is easy, if one is
willing to drive single-mindedly over stubborn obstacles, to construct a syllogism
which embodies a desired result. For example, the neighborhood school policy could
be toppled this way:
Educational inequalities based on geography are unconstitutional; neighborhood
schools cannot be equal because they draw students of uneven motivation and
preparation; therefore, states must abandon the neighborhood system.
The unitary school concept of Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), could
be put to similar use:
Because of past discrimination southern schools cannot employ otherwise valid
plans that fail to achieve integration; de facto segregation is in part a product
of official discrimination in housing; therefore, northern states must liquidate
the effects of their discriminatory practices by integrating the schools.
These oversimplified illustrations underscore the need (I) to observe carefully what
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agree that the decisions did not foreclose such classifi.cation.38 The
opinions were limited in terms to education, and the explicit reason
for not applying Plessy was that separate facilities were seen as inherently unequal in that field. If Brown had imposed a general
ban on racial lines, Plessy would have been obliterated rather than
"out of place," and the discussion of separation and inequality which
comprised much of the opinion would have been wholly gratuitous.
The fact that the cases were argued on the theory of a constitutional.
color-bar30 serves to underline the Court's familiarity ·with that approach and its choice of another rationale.40
But a more serious threat to the validity of corrective racial classification is presented when the school cases are interpreted in conjunction with the per curiam rulings which followed them. Although
Brown had concluded only that "in the field of public education
the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place," 41 per curiam decisions soon struck dmm segregation in public parks,42 busses,43 golf
courses, 44 and beaches.45 Because racial distinctions were common to
all the cases and because there was little evidence of inherent inequality in those cases decided per curiam, some ·writers have suggested that Brown and its progeny may prohibit all governmental
classification by race. 46 Despite this impressive support, it is submitted that such an interpretation is not desirable, was probably not
contemplated, and is certainly not required.
The first of the relevant per curiam decisions was handed down
early in the 1955 Term. 47 The Court, citing no authority, affirmed
a judgment invalidating state-enforced segregation of public beaches
and bathhouses. Other per curiam holdings to the same effect came
quickly. 48 Each of the cases raised an issue of state power to exclude
the School Segregation Cases specifically decided, (2) to assign proper weight to competing values in determining where the decisions should lead us in the future, and
(3) not to confuse points (1) and (2).
38. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (1958); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Co11stit11tio11al Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. I (1959).
39. See report of oral argument in 21 U.S.L.W. 3163 (Dec. 16, 1952); 22 U.S.L.W.
3157 (Dec. 15, 1953).
40. It is significant that Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), characterized racial
classifications as "suspect" but avoided the further step of holding them unconstitutional per se.
41. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
42. New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
43. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
44. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
45. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
46. P. KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LmERTY 219 (1956) ("no classification
based on race or color can be accepted'); "Wechsler, SllfJra note 38, at 32.
47. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
48. See notes 42-44 supra.
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Negroes from public facilities on racial grounds when allegedly equal
facilities were available to them. Important and comprehensive as
the question was, it surely did not call for a ruling as to whether
official classification by race is inevitably unconstitutional in every
context, without regard to its purpose or effect. And if the Court
meant to embrace that far-reaching proposition, the vehicle of per
curiam decision would seem a singularly inappropriate way to announce it.
The impression that the per curiam cases prohibit all racial
classification rests largely on the view that those cases, in supposed
contrast to Brown, were devoid of evidence of inherent inequality.
Yet if there was little evidence that separate golf courses and similar
separate facilities were incapable of equalization, there was even
less support for the expansive notion that race is always unrelated to legitimate public objectives, or that such a relationship
is necessarily irrelevant. More moderate approaches to the issue
of segregated facilities were certainly available. The Brown case
would clearly control some situations, such as attempts to restrict
black students to the rear of a public school bus or to segregate
them at school-sponsored athletic events.49 Public playgrounds, too,
though dissociated from the schools, might properly fall within the
same rule since Brown relied on the "deleterious effects [of segregation] upon the colored children in implying their inferiority" 50effects which can be stimulated outside the classroom as well
as within it. When facilities are ordinarily used exclusively by
adults, the analogy to Brown is less compelling, but even in those
instances the rationale of Bolling v. Sharpe remains persuasive. For
if segregation in the schools "is not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective," 51 it is difficult to see what legitimate purpose could be promoted by segregating other public facilities. School
segregation implies an inferior status for Negro children, but "is it
not equally relevant to suggest that Negroes may properly regard all
segregation legislation as an expression of racial superiority by
the white race?" 52 It seems that the implications of Brown and
Bolling were bound to radiate beyond the schools and that a court
49. Cf. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), which applied
the separate but equal doctrine to strike down official segregation in a university
cafeteria and other school-related facilities.
50. Wechsler, supra note 38, at 32.
51. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). The Court's implicit assumption that the associational preference of the white majority is not a legitimate public concern was forcefully challenged by Wechsler, supra note 38. But see Black, The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
52. P. K.AUPER, supra note 46, at 218.
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committed to those cases could scarcely avoid the results announced
per curiam. 153 If that is so, there is little reason to read into the decisions an intention to outlaw all uses of racial criteria. Rather, the
scope of the issues actually presented in the cases, the alternative
grounds on which those issues could be met, and the per curiam
disposition54 suggest a more modest rationale. All of the cases involved segregation by race at the behest of the politically dominant
group, and none called for the adjudication of any other issue. Accordingly, the per curiam decisions should be interpreted together
with the school cases as prohibiting official segregation of public facilities by racial classification directed against the minority class.
This construction leaves open both the question of segregation based
on other criteria and the question of purposeful integration by racial
classification. 1515
II.

THE JAPANESE RELOCATION CASES

The mass evacuation and detention of Japanese-Americans during
World War II constitutes the most repressive discrimination program
53. Attempts to distinguish between education and other state functions have
been at best partially successful. The view that noneducational activities are susceptible
to equalization without integration has failed to take account of the potential
psychological damage of segregation outside the schools. The voluntary nature of
these activities is also inconclusive since that feature dilutes the associational claims
of the majority as well as those of the minority. Moreover, the importance of education, so much stressed in Brown, is not unique; housing, domestic relations, and
hospital care, each of which has been the subject of segregation laws, also serve
important human needs. Finally, the right to equal treatment has never been confined to "fundamental" freedoms. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). It
is fair to say, all things considered, that the distinction between educational and
other facilities was destined for an early demise. See Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical
Assn., 347 U.S. 971 (1954), in which, one week after Brown, a dispute over segregated
recreational facilities was remanded "for consideration in the light of the Segregation
Cases • . • and conditions that now prevail."
54. There is no doubt that the per curiam device has been misused on other occasions and little doubt that in the segregation Cases it would have been advisable
to prepare at least one opinion to bridge the gap between educational and recreational
facilities. See generally Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, The Supreme Court 1957 Term,
72 HARV. L. REY. 77 (1958). Nevertheless, an expansive interpretation of per curiam
results should not be favored without convincing supportive evidence.
55. Recent cases implementing Brown seem consistent with this analysis. For
example, Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963), struck down a transfer plan
which permitted students assigned to new schools, at which they were a racial
minority, to return to their former schools in which they would constitute a majority. The Court emphasized that these racial cl~fications were productive of
segregation: "The transfer plans being based solely on racial factors which, under
their terms, inevitably lead toward segregation of the students by race, we conclude
that they run counter to the admonition of Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S.
294 ••••" 373 U.S. at 684-85. Compare Monroe v. Board of Commrs., 391 U.S. 450
(1968) and Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (free choice plans purposefully achieving minimal disruption to dual school system held invalid), with
Alabama State Teachers Assn. v. Alabama Pub. School &: College Authority, 289 F.
Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968), affd per curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969) (traditional free choice
policy at the college level upheld as consistent with a unitary school plan).
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undertaken by the federal government in modern times. Those
measures deserve careful consideration since they probably mark, if
they do not exceed, the outer limits of governmental power to classify
racially. 56 The pertinent aspects of the program began on February
19, 1942, when President Roosevelt issued an executive order authorizing the Department of War to prescribe military areas "in such
places and of such extent" as it might choose, from which "any or all
persons" could be excluded or subjected to any restrictions. 57
Armed with that sweeping authority, General DeWitt, the military
commander for the west coast states, issued a series of directives which
culminated in the exclusion of more than 100,000 persons of Japanese· descent from California, southern Arizona, and western Washington and Oregon, territory which he labeled Military Area No. I.
First, an 8:00 P.M. curfew was imposed on enemy aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry in regions of the Pacific coast which included the metropolitan centers where those groups were heavily
concentrated. Then he issued orders prohibiting Japanese-Americans
from leaving Military Area No. I and confining them to centers
where they were processed for evacuation and, usually, prolonged
detention. In March, Congress strengthened the hand of the Executive by enacting a statute which made it a misdemeanor knowingly
to violate restrictions imposed by a military commander in a military area. 58
General DeWitt's curfew order was brought before the Supreme
Court in Hirabayashi v. United States. 59 The appellant, an American
citizen of Japanese ancestry and a student at the University of "Washington, had been convicted on nvo counts of violating the federal
statute by failing to report for pre-evacuation proceedings and by
remaining away from home after 8:00 P.M. Since the sentences on
those counts were to run concurrently, the Court considered the
validity of the curfew only. Hirabayashi's principal contention was
that the due process clause of the fifth amendment prohibited the
differential treatment of persons of Japanese descent. Speaking
through Mr. Chief Justice Stone, the Court unanimously rejected
that contention:
56. See generally J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART 8: F. MATSON, PREJUDICE, '\'/AR AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1954); Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The
Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 CoLUM. L. REv. 175 (1945);
Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945); Comment,
Alien Enemies and Japanese-Americans: A Problem of Wartime Controls, 51 YALE
L.J. 1316 (1942).
57. Exec. Order No. 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092, 1093 (1938-1943 Comp.).
58. Act of March 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173.
59. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).

June 1969]

Permissible Classification by Race

1565

Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant
and therefore prohibited, it by no means follows that, in dealing
·with the perils of war, Congress and the Executive are wholly precluded from taking into account those facts and circumstances which
are relevant to measures for our national defense and for the successful prosecution of the war, and which may in fact place citizens
of one ancestry in a different category from others. . . . The adoption by Government, in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion,
of measures for the public safety based upon the recognition of facts
and circumstances which indicate that a group of one national extraction may menace that safety more than others, is not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution and is not to be condemned
merely because in other and in most circumstances racial distinctions
are irrelevant.oo
The circumstances which saved the classification were (1) that the
West Coast was peculiarly vulnerable to invasion or sabotage because
of its proximity to Japan and because of its concentration of military
and industrial facilities, (2) that previous discrimination against the
Japanese had impeded their assimilation and encouraged continued
attachment to Japanese institutions, and (3) that there were known to
be disloyal elements in the Japanese community which could not
readily be identified and isolated.
vVe cannot say that these facts and circumstances, considered in the
particular war setting, could afford no ground for differentiating
citizens of Japanese ancestry from other groups in the United States.
The fact alone that attack on our shores was threatened by Japan
rather than another enemy power set these citizens apart from others
who have no particular associations with Japan. 61
Although the Chief Justice's guarded opinion avoided any decision on evacuation, it nevertheless became the basis for sustaining
the exclusionary power when the evacuation issue was presented in
Korematsu v. United States. 62 In the latter case, the Court, by a six-tothree majority, upheld the conviction of an American citizen of
Japanese descent who had been found in Military Area No. 1 in
violation of official orders, but whose personal loyalty was not questioned. It acknowledged that the exclusion restricted the civil rights
of a single racial group and therefore was constitutionally "suspect,"
but stressed that the order was based on public necessity and not on
racial antagonism:
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference
60. 320 U.S. at 100-01.
61. 320 U.S. at 101.
62. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses
the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are
at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted
military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt
constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided
that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens
of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily,
and finally, because Congress reposing its confidence in this time
of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-determined
that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence
of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered
that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannotby availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight-now say
that at that time these actions were unjustified. 63

The Relocation Cases plainly support the view that racially differentiated governmental action is permissible in some circumstances. 64 According to those opinions, racial distinctions are "not
wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution" 65 and may be justified
by "pressing public necessity.'' 66 Yet the Relocation Cases have almost invariably been used to strike dO"wn, rather than to allow, official
classification by race. 67 The inevitable question, therefore, is whether
those decisions have current vitality insofar as they permitted differential treatment of Japanese-Americans in the context of war.
For purposes of this Article that is the only issue, of the many raised
by the evacuation, which requires discussion. On this issue it seems
likely that, despite the odiousness of racial disabilities, the Court
would adhere to the Relocation Cases in comparable circumstances
of wartime emergency. 68
63. 323 U.S. at 223-24 (emphasis omitted). Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson
dissented but did not dispute the government's power to differentiate between
Japanese-Americans and other persons, a power which each of them had voted to
sustain in Hirabayashi.
64. Although the racial lines of the evacuation program were drawn in terms of
ancestry rather than color, the Court regarded "race" as the classifying trait and
attached no importance to that distinction. Some commentators, noting that Ameri•
cans "having an ethnic affinity with our Asiatic enemy" were treated differently from
those having an affinity "with our white European enemies," have equated the
Japanese-American classification with differentiation by color. J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART &: F. MATSON, supra note 56, at 384 n.3.
65. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943).
66. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
67. The technique has been to leave the cases undisturbed but to cite them for
the proposition that racial classifications are suspect. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
68. The fact that members of the Court who were thoroughly committed to the
protection of civil liberties unanimously sustained the classification-as distinguished
from the use to which that classification was put in Korematsu-is more revealing
than views expressed "from the vantage point of ••. tranquil times." "\Van-en, The

June 1969]

Permissible Classification by Race

1567

The most instructive, if uninspiring, cases on this question are
those dealing with the constitutional rights of enemy aliens. 69 It has
long been settled that the fifth and fourteenth amendments protect
resident aliens, 70 and generally the outbreak of war has had little
impact on the legal position of nationals of friendly countries. 71 But
drastically different rules apply to the citizen of a nation at war with
the United States. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that the
federal government may seize his property without payment of compensation.72 In addition, the enemy alien "is constitutionally subject to summary arrest, internment and deportation whenever a
'declared war' exists. Courts will entertain his plea for freedom from
Executive custody only to ascertain the existence of a state of war
and whether he is an alien enemy and so subject to the Alien
Enemy Act." 73 These rules apply irrespective of the individual's
personal loyalty to the United States and have been explained on
the theory that the exercise of basic freedoms by an enemy alien
would redound to the advantage of the enemy nation:
The enemy alien is bound by an allegiance which commits him to
lose no opportunity to forward the cause of our enemy; hence the
United States, assuming him to be faithful to his allegiance, regards
him as part of the enemy resources. It therefore takes measures to
disable him from commission of hostile acts imputed as his intention because they are a duty to his sovereign.74

There was thus strong precedent for the differential treatment
Bill of Rights and the Military, in THE GREAT RIGHTS IOI (E. Cahn ed. 1963). Although these cases were decided before Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court considered the
issues of inequality through the due process clause, as Bolling was to do some years
later.
69. "In the primary meaning of the words .•. an alien enemy is the subject of a
foreign state at war with the United States." Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 229, 128
N.E. 185, 186 (1920) Qudge Cardozo), quoted with approval in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 n.2 (1950). This is the meaning of the term as used in the
Alien Enemy Act, which provides that "natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects" of a
hostile nation "shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured and removed"
on order of the President. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). Congress has sometimes explicitly
limited the meaning of the term in statutes affecting property rights. See Guessefeldt
v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308 (1952).
70. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
71. Puttkammer, Alien Enemies and Alien Friends, in WAR AND THE LAw 38, 49
(E. Puttkammer ed. 1944).
72. Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469, 475 (1947); Cummings v.
Deutsche Bank, 300 U.S. 115, 120 (1937); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
109, 121 (1814) (Chief Justice Marshall). But cf. Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308,
317-19 (1952). The right of friendly aliens to receive compensation was settled by
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
73. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950).
74. 339 U.S. at 772-73.
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of Japanese, German, and Italian aliens during the war. 76 The critical
challenges to the classification of the Relocation Cases were that it
(I) included not only Japanese nationals but also their descendants,
and (2) did not include descendants of German and Italian nationals.
The first was, to be sure, a significant step. Yet if Japanese aliens
were subject to internment and deportation without a hearing solely
because of their nationality, it would be difficult to show that Japanese-Americans who were born in the United States must remain
totally immune to all differential treatment based on ancestry. Such
radical differences in liability do not appear to have been justified
by any known differences in the personality of the two groups. It
was considered "naive" in the circumstances of the war to assume
"that actual loyalties within the family corresponded to this rigid
dichotomy" 76 between the Japanese alien and the United States
citizen of Japanese descent. And while a plausible argument can be
made that nationality is a more suitable classifying trait for a security
program than ancestry, the distinction between the two types of classification is often subtle.77 Both classifications are grossly overinclusive
and are defensible, if at all, only because of the emergency produced
by a declared war. Perhaps certain restrictions applicable to enemy
nationals should be inapplicable to enemy descendants. But if differences in nationality warrant the severe restraints authorized by the
75. The Alien Enemy Act was adopted by Congress in 1798 and has remained in
effect with minor modifications in language. During both world wars enemy aliens
were interned and enemy .property seized. See Comment, supra note 56, at 1318. The
statute was held to be valid in Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948), in which a
German national was deported on order of the Attorney General after internment
during the war. To the same effect, see the many lower court cases collected in the
Ludecke opinion. 335 U.S. at 165 n.8. Ludecke did not suggest as lower courts sometimes had, that enemy aliens are not entitled to due process protection, a view which
would be at odds with the settled rule that enemy- aliens are "persons" within the
meaning of the fifth amendment. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
76. Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1253, 1302 (1942). In the
case of Japanese-Americans, the source of the dichotomy also commended its deemphasis. Children of Japanese immigrants had become American citizens by birth;
the immigrants themselves were disqualified by statute, because of race and color,
from eligibility for naturalization. See notes 112-16 infra and accompanying text.
Distinctions like these, one may say without disrespect for citizenship, provide a
dubious basis for allocating fundamental rights.
77. Nationality, like ancestry, may be inherited and frequently has no relation to
personal loyalties. Under the rule of jus sanguinis, which is widely followed, a child
wherever born acquires the nationality of his father. 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
1073-78 (2d ed. 1945). Thus consanguinity may determine enemy status under either
classification. Of course, ancestry cannot be voluntarily relinquished, as nationality
sometimes can. But the validity of classification by national origin has not turned on
whether or not aliens could or did renounce their foreigu nationality. The Alien Enemy
Act applies, for example, to "natives" of a hostile power, meaning those born in
the enemy country, even though the status in question is involuntary and unalterable. United States ex rel. D'Esquiva v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1943).
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Alien Enemy Act, it is hard to deny that differences in ancestry may
support at least some differential treatment.
The use of ancestry, rather than nationality, as a classifying
trait can be better appraised when the alien enemy law is stripped of
the fiction that nationals of hostile powers are bound to aid the
enemy.78 The notion that a resident alien has a legal duty to act illegally, notwithstanding his own sentiments to the contrary, is bad
law and bad social psychology. 79 The real reason for upholding the
enemy alien classification is not that personal commitments are irrelevant but that they are difficult to discern; and the reason for
focusing attention on the class is that personal affiliation with an
enemy nation is believed to enhance the potential for disloyal action.
Affiliations of this kind cut across the lines of citizenship, however,
and the suspicions which they generate probably have essentially the
same foundations in the case of enemy descendants as in the case of
enemy aliens. so Viewed from this perspective, the crucial issue is
not so much whether the government classifies by nationality or by
ancestry, but whether, under either classification, adequate opportunities are assured for individual adjudication and whether any
burdens temporarily imposed are narrowly circumscribed.81
78. Just why a resident alien should be conclusively presumed to give actual
allegiance to the country from which he emigrated has never been made clear. In
Great Britain the presumption led to the internment of Jewish refugees, apparently
on the theory that they were in the country to do Hitler's bidding. See Cohn, Legal
Aspects of Internment, 4 Moo. L. REv. 200 (1941).
79. See Rostow, supra note 56, at 519-20.
80. Reliable scientific evidence concerning the probable conduct of either class is
scarce. Furthermore, since the principal internal danger during war is usually sporadic
sabotage or espionage rather than mass disaffection, generalizations about group
behavior have questionable value. It can be argued, on the other hand, that classification by ancestry and nationality should both be abandoned. However, courts have
shown no inclination to protect enemy nationals in the face of wartime demands,
and even Justices who favor substantial protection contend that "[t]he needs of the
hour may well require summary apprehension and detention of alien enemies."
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 187 (1948) Gustice Douglas, dissenting).
81. There was widespread agreement during the war that the distinction between
citizens and aliens should be rejected and that individual determinations of loyalty
should be made at the earliest opportunity. There was also wide agreement that an
overinclusive classification of suspects, drawn in terms of group affiliations, was necessary in order to disarm the few members of each group who presented a real threat
and who could not be easily identified. See, e.g., Rheinstein, The Armed Forces and
the Civilian Population, in WAR AND THE LAw 58 (E. Puttkammer ed. 1944); Comment, supra note 56. The evidence concerning ~e extent of the threat has been
extensively debated, but outspoken critics of the evacuation have conceded that in
certain situations "some preventive action was imperative." J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART
&: F. MATSON, supra note 56, at 284. Given the difficulty of distinguishing between
real and apparent internal dangers, many observers felt that some differential action
could have been devised, pending further investigation, which would have protected
the national security and still avoided the repressive measures imposed upon JapaneseAmericans.

1570

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:1553

The second ground for challenging the classification of the evacuation program was that it did not extend to German and Italian
descendants and hence was underinclusive. Because exemptions of
this type are less offensive than overinclusive ones, which reach innocent persons who happen to share circumstances with the blameworthy, they are said to be permissible if supported by "fair reason." 82
The justification offered by the War Department for exempting German and Italian descendants was that those groups were less dangerous than Japanese-Americans and that deployment of forces to deal
with them would greatly "overtax our strength." 83 It was argued too
that the inclusion of German and Italian descendants could prejudice loyal Japanese-Americans by delaying individualized treatment,84 and finally that "the fact alone that attack on our shores was
threatened by Japan rather than by another enemy power set
Uapanese-American] citizens apart from others who have no particular association with Japan." 85These considerations may have concealed the real motives for the evacuation, but they would probably
constitute "fair reason" for an exemption from some kinds of differential action.
The foregoing analysis in no way implies the general viability of
the Relocation Cases. Those cases have properly been condemned for
permitting the imposition of highly obnoxious restraints on a long
term basis, for dispensing with vital safeguards of procedural due
process, and for relaxing judicial control over the military to an unprecedented level. What these excesses show, however, is not the unconstitutionality of the Japanese-American classification but an outrageous use of that classification.86 It does not follow, of course, that
because the government was allowed to classify racially during the
emergency of total war, it may do so in the completely different context of the public schools. The significance of the Relocation Cases
lies mainly in demonstrating that even racial lines which purposefully burden a minority race have not been held unconstitutional
82. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341, 348-51 (1949). But cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
83. Quoted in J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART & F. MATSON, supra note 56, at 303.
84. Cf. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (holding post-evacuation detention of
loyal Japanese to be unauthorized).
85. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943).
86. As previously noted, the Supreme Court was unanimous in upholding the
classification; disagreement centered on the nature of the disabilities which could be
imposed. That such overinclusiveness need not produce harsh results was illustrated
by the experience of alien hearing boards which conducted investigations "with a
minimal interference with the standards of justice in the community" and which
offered recommendations which prompted the parole or release of many enemy aliens
arrested on suspicion. Rostow, supra note 56, at 493.
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per se. Insofar as corrective racial classification in the schools may
disadvantage one group or another,87 this limited proposition seems a
necessary, though insufficient, predicate for such classification.

III.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ALIENS

The war relocation program was not the first occasion for legitimating federal discrimination by race. In other areas, notably immigration and naturalization, the Court has declared Congressional
power to be "plenary" so that racial classification is apparently not
foreclosed. 88

A. Immigration and Deportation
Immigration quotas, which were intended to preserve a desired
racial balance in the population of the United States,89 present an
especially close analogy to the problem of de facto segregation. The
Chinese Exclusion Case00 is the logical starting point for discussion.
In that case a Chinese alien who had lived in San Francisco for twelve
years was denied re-entry to the United States following a brief visit
to China. Before the trip he had been issued a certificate of re-entry
pursuant to a federal law which suspended new immigration of Chinese laborers but exempted resident aliens who journeyed abroad. 91
Upon presenting the certificate, he was refused admission because a
statute enacted during his return cruise voided all outstanding certificates and prohibited the re-entry of former resident Chinese laborers.92 In the Supreme Court he contended that the statute deprived
him of liberty without due process of law.
Mr. Justice Field, writing for a unanimous Court, upheld the
statute and stated that the power to regulate immigration was an inherent incident of sovereignty and that no vested rights could be
conferred by the certificate. He emphasized the "non-assimilability"
of Chinese aliens and the fears which they had evoked.
[T]hey remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves,
87. See notes 266-78 infra and accompanying text.
88. See generally C. GORDON &: H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
(rev. ed. 1967): M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC JN AMERICAN LAW (1946);
Boudin, The Settler Within Our Gates, 26 N.Y.U. L. REv. 266 (1951); Hesse, The

Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The
Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578 (1959); Developments in the Law-Immigration and
Nationality, 66 HARv. L. REv. 643 (1953); Comment, The Alien and the Constitution,
20 U. Cm. L. REv. 547 (1953).
89. C. GORDON &: H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 88, at 2-29.
90. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
91. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 4, 22 Stat. 58, as amended, Act of July 5, 1884,
ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115.
92. Act of Oct. I, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504.
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and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It
seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people or to make
any change in their habits or modes of living. As they grew in number each year the people of the coast saw, or believed they saw ...
great danger that at no distant day that portion of our country
would be overrun by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict
their immigration.93
The opinion then asserted that it was the nation's "highest duty"
to provide security from foreign aggression.
It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come,
whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character or
from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. The government,
possessing the powers which are to be exercised for protection and
security, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which
the powers shall be called forth; and its determination, so far as the
subjects affected are concerned, are [sic] necessarily conclusive upon
all its departments and officers. If, therefore, the government of the
United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who ·will not
assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their
exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual
hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects ....
[I]ts determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.94
The Court's vague references to nonassimilability, national security,
unreviewability, and incidents of sovereignty left the rationale of the
case in considerable doubt, but the power to exclude aliens on the
basis of race was acknowledged unequivocally. 95
In contrast to immigration practices, the authority to deport
aliens has generally not been exerted along racial lines. However,
Fong Yue Ting v. United States,96 decided shortly after the exclusionary power had been sustained, dealt with a situation that approximated expulsion on the ground of race.97 In Fong deportation
proceedings were brought against Chinese aliens who did not possess
certificates of residence, as required by federal law. A statute pro93. 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889).
94. 130 U.S. at 606.
95. That power was exercised against Asiatic groups in 1917 and against persons
ineligible for citizenship in 1924. M. KoNVITz, supra note 88, at 22·28. The power
was reinforced by dicta broadly asserting that "No limits can be put by the courts
upon the power of Congress to protect [against] ••• the advent of aliens whose race
or habits render them undesirable as citizens ••••" '\Vong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896).
96. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
97. In subsequent cases, the authority to expel aliens, like the authority to
exclude them, has been reasserted in broad terms. See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U.S. 276, 280 (1921), stating that "Congress has power to order at any time the
deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful • • • ."
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vided that all resident Chinese laborers must apply for such certificates and that those failing to do so would be deemed to have entered
the country unlawfully. 98 Deportation was mandatory unless the alien
could show that he had been prevented by unavoidable cause from
complying with the statute and could prove by a "white" witness that
he was a resident at the time the statute was enacted.
Mr. Justice Gray stated for a six-to-three majority that the Court
should not "undertake to pass upon political questions, the final
decision of which has been committed by the Constitution to other
departments of the government.'' 99 Reasoning from that admonition,
he found that the power to expel residents was no less sweeping than
the authority to exclude nonresidents: "The right of the nation to
expel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized or taken
any steps toward becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the
same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent_ their entrance into the country." 100 The further
requirement that residence be proved by the testimony of white witnesses was regarded as a legislatively prescribed rule of evidence and
was upheld by analogy to naturalization provisions, which required
certain proofs by the testimony of citizens rather than of aliens.101
The relevance of the alien exclusion cases to current questions
of racial classification depends initially upon the rationale of the
decisions. At least four interpretations are possible: (I) that constitutional limitations do not apply to immigration; (2) that nonresident aliens have no standing to press these claims; (3) that the
question of who shall be admitted to the United States is inappropriate for judicial review; and (4) that constitutional limitations
are applicable but were not transgressed. Each of those explanations is consistent with the plain import of the cases that Congress
may discriminate by race in fixing the national immigration policy.
The first three interpretations, however, whatever their merit, could
have no bearing on the problem of racial imbalance in the schools.
With respect to the fourth, a strong argument has been made that the
Chinese Exclusion Case must have been predicated on the nonassimilability of Chinese aliens, since any other rationale would reduce the discussion of that factor to irrelevance.
98. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25.
99. 149 U.S. 698, 712 (1893).
100. 149 U.S. at 707. The Court emphasized that earlier statutes had not solved
the problem of enforcing immigration restrictions, and it dismissed the substantive
due process question with the observation that Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, ll8 U.S. 356
(1886), on which the aliens relied, involved state power to regulate rather than
federal power to deport.
101. 149 U.S. at 730.
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If the power of Congress to exclude foreigners is absolute, of what
legal significance are the difficulties of the State of California because
of the "Oriental invasion"? The answer is that ... no arm of the
Government is clothed with absolute power under the Constitution.
No power in our Government can therefore be exercised voluntarily
or arbitrarily, but must always be exercised in accordance with the
spirit of the Constitution as gathered from all of its provisions....
Hence the elaborate defense of the Act of Congress by speaking of
the necessity of preventing an alleged Oriental invasion. 102

This suggestion that racial classification to prevent "overpopulation"
by one race was held to be compatible with due process could make
the case applicable to problems of de facto segregation.
There is much, indeed, to be said for the general proposition
that plenary power to exclude aliens does not imply authority to act
arbitrarily. The importance of maintaining a "regime of law" and
of imposing proper limits on government transcends the interests
immediately involved, whether they concern residents or nonresidents.103 It is quite another matter, however, to construe the Chinese
Exclusion Case as adopting and acting upon this principle. The fact
that the opinion discussed the assimilability of Chinese aliens, which
perhaps was unnecessary under the Court's basic approach, is inconclusive. The Court also discussed other issues which would become irrelevant if nonassimilability were decisive. The point on
which it placed chief reliance was that the exclusionary power had
been committed to the "conclusive determination" of the political
departments of government.104 Other alien admission cases have put
the emphasis elsewhere, but they too disclaim rather than apply
constitutional restraints. Thus United States ex rel. Turner v.
Williams, 105 in which an alien was excluded on the ground that he
was an anarchist, gave first amendment freedoms the same abrupt
treatment that had been given to racial discrimination in earlier exclusion cases:
[W]e suppose counsel does not deny that this Government has the
power to exclude an alien who believes in or advocates the overthrow
of the Government or of all governments by force or the assassination of officials. To put that question is to answer it. 106
The Turner case does not delimit the protection afforded free speech,
and the Chinese Exclusion Case does not measure the right to be free
102. Boudin, supra note 88, at 460-61 (1951).
103. See Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1390 (1953).
104. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
105. 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
106. 194 U.S. at 293.
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from racial discrimination; indeed, these cases simply do not speak
in terms of the Bill of Rights. Instead the Court has proceeded in
this area from the broad premise that an "alien who seeks admission
to this country may not do so under any claim of right." 107 Thus,
since due process standards have not been applied to alien exclusion
cases, those decisions lack persuasive appeal in areas like public
education in which such standards are controlling.108 And even under
a contrary interpretation, the cases would have limited precedential
value, for subsequent decisions such as Bolling v. Sharpe, 109 have
made the federal government subject to restraints of equal protection as well as subject to nineteenth century notions of due process.
If the Court has not held that the use of racial criteria conforms
to the requirements of due process in exclusion cases, it certainly
has not implied that such criteria would survive a fifth amendment test in deportation proceedings. Constitutional safeguards have
been applied far more rigorously in expulsion than in exclusion
cases, 110 despite occasional dicta suggesting the equivalence of the
nvo powers. Even Fong Yue Ting did not countenance expulsion of
a race although it did approve a registration requirement applicable
only to Chinese aliens and a presumption of unlawful entry attaching to noncompliance. Since there were other excluded classes
who might have entered the country illegally, and since there were
many lawfully resident Chinese, some of whom perhaps could not
prove proper entry, the statute deserved much closer attention than
it received in the majority opinion. 111 At any rate, it is clear that the
107. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
108. It may fairly be said that the Chinese Exclusion Case, while not applying
due process standards, appeared to regard racial disqualifications as reasonable. The
implications of that view for de facto school segregation would be interesting to
contemplate if the view had been based on reliable evidence and had recent support.
It was based, however, on the premise that Chinese aliens were nonassimilable.
Neither that premise nor the theory that racial exclusions are reasonable has had
much support of late.
109. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
lIO. Compare Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)
(alien seeking admission is not entitled to procedural due process), with Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (resident alien has constitutional right to fair
hearing). But cf. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), indicating that substantive due
process standards are inapplicable to both deportation and exclusion.
lll. The constitutional validity of an alien registration requirement was implied
in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), but different issues are presented when
the requirement runs against a single racial class. Closer attention should also
have been given to the special procedural rules applied to Chinese aliens. Only
persons of Chinese descent were required to prove lawful residence by witnesses of a
particular race with whom they probably had limited contact. Furthermore, upon
a claim of citizenship, the burden of proof fell on the claimant if he was Chinese,
but on the Government in all other cases. See United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v.
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Court viewed the provision as a means of enforcing the immigration
law, and made no attempt to justify it on independent grounds. Consequently, the racial classification sustained in Fong Yue Ting should
be absorbed under whatever rationale underlies the immigration
cases.
B. Naturalization Laws and Their By-Products

Beginning in 1790 Congress imposed racial restrictions on the
eligibility of aliens for naturalization,112 and those restrictions led
in tum to collateral disabilities at the state and local levels of government. The leading cases on those respective problems were Ozawa v.
United States113 and Terrace v. Thompson. 114 In Ozawa a Japanese
alien, who was admittedly well qualified by education and character,
applied for American citizenship after twenty years of continuous
residence in the United States. His application was denied on the
ground that he was a member of the Japanese "race" and hence
was ineligible for naturalization under a statute making citizenship
available to "free white persons and . . . persons of African descent."115 The Supreme Court, responding to certified questions of
statutory construction, held that Japanese aliens were ineligible for
naturalization under the quoted provision, but it did not consider
the constitutionality of the racial disqualification. In Terrace the
same disqualification served to restrict the freedom of Japanese aliens
to own real property. The plaintiffs in that case sought to enjoin
the enforcement of a state statute prohibiting land ownership by
aliens who had not declared their intention to become citizens. The
Court rejected a contention that the prospective application of the
statute to prevent the leasing of property to Japanese aliens would
violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment:
The rule established by Congress on this subject, in and of itself,
furnishes a reasonable basis for classification in a state law withholding from aliens the privilege of land ownership as defined in the
act....
"It is obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become
one lacks an interest in, and the power to effectually work for the
welfare of, the state, and, so lacking, the state may rightfully deny
Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923). For these procedural variations, there was surely no justification. Cf. United States ex rel. Lee Kum Hoy v. Murff, 355 U.S. 169 (1957).
112. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103.
113. 260 U.S. 178 (1922). See also United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1928).
114. 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
115. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254 [REY, STAT. § 2169], as amended,
Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 318.
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him the right to own and lease real estate within its boundaries. If
one incapable of citizenship may lease or own real estate, it is within
the realm of possibility that every foot of land within the state might
pass to the ownership or possession of non-citizens."116

The naturalization and alien land cases shed no light on the
validity of corrective classification by race. The former began and
ended with an inquiry into the intent of Congress. No constitutional
question seems to have been raised, and none was decided. Later
the Court gratuitously announced in Terrace that "Congress is not
trammeled, and it may grant or withhold the privilege of naturalization upon any grounds or without any reason, as it sees fit." 117 The
clear implication of this dictum was that the privilege of citizenship
could be withheld on grounds which do not satisfy fifth amendment
standards.
The alien land cases, on the other hand, passed directly on the
issues of due process and equal protection. But while state incorporation of federal classification by race was there sustained, it is doubtful
that those decisions represent the present law. The Court's lame
analysis of the issues has been well exposed.118 The basic point is that
federal use of a particular standard for one purpose could not establish the validity of state applications of that standard to an entirely
different purpose. No doubt this would have been self-evident if
the states had conditioned a criminal defendant's right to a fair
trial upon his eligibility for citizenship. But common-law restrictions
peculiar to land mmership119 facilitated a ruling that the naturalization law "in and of itself furnishes a reasonable basis" 120 for the state
classification. That ruling was unsound when issued and has been undermined by subsequent decisions. 121 Accordingly, state courts have
taken the initiative in repudiating the Terrace case and in holding
alien land laws invalid on fourteenth amendment grounds. 122
IV.

RELATIONS WITH INDIAN TRIBES

Perhaps more applicable to present problems concerning the
government's use of racial criteria is the historic differential treat116. 263 U.S. 197, 220-21 (1923).
117. 263 U.S. at 220.
118. See, e.g., McGovney, Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other
States, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 7 (1947).
119. M. KoNVITZ, supra note 88, at 148-53.
120. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 220 (1923).
121. Oyama v. California, 232 U.S. 633 (1948). See also Takahashi v. Fish &: Game
Commn., 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
122. Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); Namba v. l\IcCourt, 185
Ore. 579, 204 P .2d 569 (1949).
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ment of Indians. Special restrictions have been placed on the freedom of Indians to alienate property, and the administration of
criminal law in the Indian country has varied, depending on whether
those involved in the offense were Indians.123 In a few instances Indians have received preferential or compensatory treatment, a practice which may bear on the validity of some proposals to alleviate the
consequences of prejudice against Negroes.
The central question concerning the applicability of this body
of law to other groups is whether or not the differential treatment of
Indians is based on race. The late Felix Cohen argued vigorously
that it is not. He emphasized that the relevant constitutional provisions124 refer to Indian "tribes" and Indians "not taxed," and he
urged that these are political designations which confer "no authority
to govern Indians as a racial group." 125 Under Cohen's view the
special treatment of Indians can be explained by their allegiance to
resident tribal nations, thereby making this line of precedents inapplicable to any other class, and enabling individual Indians to
secure nondifferential treatment by severing their tribal ties. Support for his view is implicit in the principle of tribal self-government, which has a nonracial basis described by Chief Justice Marshall in a landmark case: 126
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent, political communities ....
. . . The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes
[their right of self-government]; and the settled doctrine of the law
of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self-government-by associating with a stronger,
and taking its protection....
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community. . . . The
whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by
our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United
States.127
123. For an extensive account of these issues, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
FEDERAL INDIAN I.Aw (1966). See also Brown, The Indian Problem and the Law, 39
YALE L.J. 307 (1930); Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REv.
144 (1940); Krieger, Principles of the Indian Law and the Act of June 18, 1934, 3 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 279 (1935).
124. The principal sources of federal authority over Indians are the commerce
clause (U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8), and the powers to make treaties (U.S. CoNsr. art. 2,
§ 2) and to regulate territories and possessions (U.S. CoNsr. art. 4, § 3). FEDERAL INDIAN
I.Aw, supra note 123, at 21-33.
125. Cohen, supra note 123, at 186 (emphasis omitted).
126. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
127. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-61.
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Similar support for Cohen's thesis is found in Elk v. Wilkins,12 8
which relied on tribal rather than racial factors in holding that the
fourteenth amendment does not confer citizenship on Indians born
in the United States:
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States,
members of, and owing immediate allegiance, to one of the Indian
tribes (an alien, though dependent, power), although in a geographical sense born in the United States, are no more "born in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," within the
meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than
the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the
domain of that government, or the children born within the United
States, of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations.129

Nevertheless, although much federal Indian law can be explained
on a racially neutral basis, some of it cannot. For example, Congress
has at times removed restraints on alienation of property for mixedblood Indians while retaining them for full-bloods. A classification
in terms of the quantum of Indian blood is blatantly unrelated to
tribal affiliation, and yet this statutory scheme was enforced by the
Supreme Court in a series of cases.130 Since restraints on freedom
of alienation were designed "to protect the Indian against sharp
practices,''131 governmental action lifting the restraints for mixedbloods and preserving them for full-bloods must reflect a legislative
determination as to the capabilities of each group. Occasionally
courts have explicitly endorsed that determination,13 2 but more often
they have simply affirmed that "it was within the power of Congress
to continue to restrict alienation by requiring, as to full-blood Indians, the consent of the Secretary of the Interior to a proposed
alienation ...." 133 In either event, racial generalizations were accepted in lieu of a precise classifying trait.
Racial considerations have similarly affected jurisdiction over
crimes in the Indian country. Although federal criminal law extends
generally to that territory, statutes have made it specifically inap128. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
129. 112 U.S. at 102.
130. United States v. Waller, 243 U.S. 452 (1917); United States v. First Natl. Bank,
234 U.S. 245 (1914); Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286 (1911). See also United
States v. Ferguson, 247 U.S. 175 (1918) (administrative determination of blood quantum
held final).
ll!l. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 123, at '788.
132. "The varying degrees of blood most naturally become the lines of demarcation between the different classes, because experience shows that generally speaking
the greater percentage of Indian blood a given allottee has, the less capable he is
by natural qualification and experience to manage his property. • . ." United States
v. Shock, 187 F. 862, 870 (I9ll).
138. Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 816 (1911).
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plicable to offenses between Indians. In United States v. Rogers,m
the Supreme Court construed an exemption from federal jurisdiction for crimes committed "by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian" to be based on the race of the parties rather
than on tribal membership. In holding that a white defendant who
had become a member of an Indian tribe through marriage was not
exempted, the Court stated:
[T]he exception is confined to those who by the usages and customs
of the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race. It does not
speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally,-of the family
of Indians; and it intended to leave them both, as regarded their
own tribe, and other tribes also, to be governed by Indian usages
and customs ....
• . . Whatever obligations the prisoner may have taken upon himself by becoming a Cherokee by adoption, his responsibility to the
laws of the United States remained unchanged and undiminished.
He was still a white man, of the white race, and therefore not
within the exception in the act of Congress.135

Since federal, state, and tribal laws, and their administration are
subject to wide variation, the Rogers interpretation placed a significant racial condition on the imposition of criminal sanctions in this
area.1sa
A number of civil statutes bear similar overtones of race but
have not been authoritatively construed. One provision states that
a "white man, not othenvise a member of any tribe" acquires no right
to tribal property by marriage.137 The statute evidently does not
operate against Indians or other nonwhites who are not members of
any tribe. Federal law also provides that in all trials involving
property disputes between an Indian and a white person "the burden
of proof shall rest upon the white person, whenever the Indian
shall make out a presumption of title in himself from the fact of
previous possession or ownership." 138 Finally, Congress has directed
that preferences be given to qualified Indians in filling vacancies for
various positions in the Indian Office.139 In some cases the mandate
134. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
135. 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572-73.
136. Under provisions presently in effect, jurisdiction over crimes in the Indian
country continues to depend in some instances on whether both the defendant and
the victim are Indians. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153 (1964). See FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra
note 123, at 319·25. However, the current provisions have been held by lower courts
to have tribal, not racial, connotations. E.g., State v. Williams, 13 Wash. 335, 43 P.
15 (1895).
137. 25 u.s.c. § 181 (1964).
138. 25 u.s.c. § 194 (1964).
139. 25 U.S.C. §§ 44, 46, 472 (1964). These preferences were retained in explicit
terms by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1964).
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for preferential hiring has been tied unmistakably to race rather
than to tribal membership. 140
It is not unlikely that many commentators will look upon the
differential treatment of the Indian as a favorable precedent for
utilizing racial classifications to remedy injustices to the Negro. Federal Indian law has classified by race,141 and in many respects the law
has been directed toward the protection of the disadvantaged minority. Some special treatment of the Indian might be explained by
previous tribal relations, since those relations may have continuing
detrimental effects which arguably the government should have
power to neutralize. But that theory would not justify differential
action based on quantum of Indian blood. Furthermore, the argument for preferential treatment of Negroes may legitimately urge
that the residual effects of slavery, black codes, and segregation are
no less debilitating than those of tribal isolation.
Yet despite those similarities, there are compelling reasons for
courts to hesitate in adopting the analogy. First, it should be noted
that the special status of Indians has rested in large part on the premise that they are a vulnerable people who, for their own protection,
must be made wards of the national government. Inasmuch as this
assumption often referred to the weakness of Indian persons rather
than of Indian "nations," it reflects attitudes of white supremacy142
that are plainly at odds with the past thirty years of race relations case
law and hence provides a dubious basis for treating other minorities.
Second, even if the analogy between the Negro and the Indian were
apt, the history of United States-Indian relations is scarcely one
which inspires imitation. Instead, that history might better serve "to
warn us that the role of the Great White Father may be bitterly resented by those in his tutelage and that a guardian ordinarily prefers
to postpone rather than to advance the day when his wards must face
the rigors of freedom." 143 Third, a racial interpretation in this area
places undue stress on a small portion of a large body of law. Although some cases involve classification by race, most of them are
140. 25 U.S.C. § 45 (1964) (preferences for "persons of Indian descent'').
141. This use of racial criteria cannot be explained and, hence, limited by the
constitutional grants of power to regulate Indian affairs. See note 124 supra. Consideration of race has not been confined to implementing treaties with Indian nations, and may well be subject to the same restrictions for that purpose as for any
other. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Although federal control over
United States possessions and over commerce with Indian tribes permits extensive
regulation, this federal power should no more authorize racial distinctions than does
the corresponding state power to regulate local commerce and local property.
142. See note 132 supra.
143. Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race
Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387, 1422 (1962).
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responsive to Mr. Cohen's formulation. 144 And when race has had a
decisive impact, that fact should invite skepticism over the merits
of the decision rather than its easy application to another group.
Finally, the value of these cases as constitutional precedent is greatly
diluted by their peculiar surrounding circumstances. The events
which led to the decisions, including treaties and physical conquests,
have no parallel in the background of non-Indian groups; and since
the cases antedate modern due process developments, 145 they did
not face squarely the difficult questions inherent in racial classification.
V.

DISCRIMINATORY JURY SELECTION

A more current illustration of the problems of classification by
race may be found in the discriminatory selection of jurors in criminal proceedings.146 The discussion of these problems will be divided
into three segments, two dealing with the jury venire and the third
with the peremptory challenge. In each situation the cases raise
major issues of racial classification, although the courts usually have
not viewed them in those terms.

A. Arbitrary Selection of the Jury Venire

Strauder v. West Virginia141 was the earliest in a long series of
jury exclusion cases. In that case, a Negro obtained review of the
denial of several motions challenging the jury panel which convicted
him of murder. A state statute provided that "All white male persons
who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State
shall be liable to serve as jurors . . . ."148 The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, holding that the racial limitation in the
statute operated to deny the defendant's right to equal protection:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly
denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of
the law, as jurors, because of their color ... is practically a brand
upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a
stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing
144. See notes 124-29 supra and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
146. Helpful discussions include Gillespie, The Constitution and the All-White
Jury, 39 KY. L.J. 65 (1950); Scott, The Supreme Court's Control over State and Fed•
eral Criminal Juries, 34 IOWA L. REv. 577 (1949); Note, The Congress, the Court and
Jury Selection: A Critique of Titles I and II of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA.
L. REv. 1069 (1966); Note, The Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury
Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal Protection, 74 YALE L.J. 919
(1965).
147. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
148. Quoted in 100 U.S. at 305.
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to individuals 0£ the race that equal justice which the law aims to
secure to all others.
. . • It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular
classes in the community, which sway the judgment 0£ jurors, and
which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons 0£ those
classes the full enjoyment 0£ that protection which others enjoy.149

The Strauder rule was quickly applied to the discriminatory administration of valid jury selection laws. 150 After the adoption of a
realistic standard of proof, 151 the Court set aside the convictions of
many Negroes who had been indicted or tried by a jury from which
members of their race had been systematically excluded. 152 Although it has been suggested that these decisions were predicated
either on a constitutional right to be tried by a jury drawn from a
representative cross section of the community,1u3 or on the statutory
right of prospective jurors not to be excluded because of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude,154 neither theory has won acceptance. The latter view was discarded by Hernandez v. Texas 155
which held that the exclusion of persons of Mexican descent denied
equal protection of the laws to a defendant member of the same class;
the former was apparently rejected in Fay v. New York 156 which upheld the use of blue ribbon panels. 157 As a result, the basis for
reversing convictions in jury selection cases remains obscure. Those
reversals, however, could be founded on one of three beliefs: (1)
that the exclusions operate to deny the defendant a fair trial; (2) that
juries treat members of the excluded class more harshly than they do
other defendants; or (3) that there is no other effective way to protect the right of minorities to participate in the administration of
justice.
Whatever may be its rationale, Strauder would not have raised
any notable problem of classification if it had announced a general
rule that no criminal conviction can stand when obtained through a
jury system from which artificial classes are systematically excluded.
But that is not the rule which has been adopted so far. Instead, courts
have repeatedly stated, without giviug due regard to the serious
149. 100 U.S. at 308-09.
150. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
151. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
152. E.g., Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356
U.S. 584 (1958); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
153. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 298 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
154. 18 u.s.c. § 243 (1964).
155. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
156. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
157. The cross section theory appeared again in Labat v. Bennett, 365 F .2d 698
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967). But see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961).
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implications of their statements, that an accused is entitled "to be indicted and tried by juries from which all members of his class are
not systematically excluded .... " 158 This peculiar principle, termed
the "same class rule," makes the defendant's affiliation with an artificial group crucial to the validity of his conviction. Consequently,
when Negroes are excluded from the jury rolls, a criminal conviction will be subject to automatic reversal if the defendant is a Negro,
but not if he is white or Indian. Such a rule has the ironic effect of
classifying by race, even though its purpose is to remedy racial discrimination. Thus, it not only indicates the permissibility of racial
classification in this area, but implicates the courts in that classification, since the same class rule was judicially created and is judicially
applied.159
These implications cannot be avoided by suggesting that the jury
cases reflect a rule of standing rather than one of substantive law. For
if the defendant's right to litigate the issue of systematic exclusion of
Negroes depends on what his own race happens to be, courts still
will have engaged in differential treatment on the basis of race. Nor
can the dilemma of the same class rule be resolved by reasoning
that it classifies in terms of injury and that racial lines are merely
coincidental. It is doubtful that black defendants are invariably
harmed by the exclusion of blacks from the jury. In fact, there
is considerable evidence that Negro defendants sometimes prefer to
be tried by an all-white jury, especially in cases in which the victim
was a Negro. 160 But more fundamentally, it simply cannot be main158. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (emphasis added). To the same
effect see, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 585 (1958). All of the Supreme
Court cases to date can be absorbed under the proposition that the arbitrary exclusion of a class denies equal protection to criminally accused members of that class.
159. The Supreme Court has not specifically endorsed the same class rule, although
its practice over several decades of reversing only the convictions of members of the
excluded class speaks a convincing language of its own. See Fay v. New York, 332
U.S. 261, 287 (1947), in which the Court noted the rule with apparent approval.
Compare State v. Brunson, 227 N.C. 558, 43 S.E.2d 82 (1947), rev'd, 333 U.S. 851
(1948) (Negro defendant objecting to exclusion of Negroes), with State v. Koritz, 227
N.C. 552, 43 S.E.2d 77, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 768 (1947) (companion case presenting
same objection by white defendant). The same class rule was developed by state
courts in response to the demands of Strauder and its progeny. Since no greater demand has been indicated by the Supreme Court during the long history of the rule,
it is not surprising to find local courts reluctant to upset criminal convictions outside
the same class context. Alexander v. State, 160 Te.x. Crim. 460, 274 S.W.2d 81, cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 872 (1954) (white man cannot complain of the exclusion of Negroes
from his jury); Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 912, 159 S.W.2d 733 (1942) (Negro cannot
complain of exclusion of whites). Contra, State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 544, 139
S.E.2d 870, 876 (1965).
160. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 225 (1965); Note, Negro Defendants and
Southern Lawyers: Review in Federal Habeas Corpus of Systematic Exclusion of
Negroes from Juries, 72 YALE L.J. 559, 569 (1963). See also H. KALYEN &: H. ZEISEL, THE
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tained that a defendant is prejudiced by arbitrary exclusions only if
he is a member of the excluded class. The consequences of excluding
Negroes may well be felt by defendants belonging to other minority
groups such as Puerto Ricans, Indians, and even white civil rights
workers. It is difficult, therefore, to resist the conclusion that the
same class rule protects some defendants who have not been harmed,
and fails to protect others who have been harmed-a conclusion
which is inconsistent with the theory of classification by injury but
compatible with that of judicial classification by race.
The racial tenor of the jury cases could be eliminated, of course,
by repudiating the same class rule and making Strauder applicable
to all defendants who show an arbitrary exclusion of any class. 161
However, the application of such a neutral rule would undermine
vital public policies by opening large numbers of stale convictions to
collateral attack.162 If all persons convicted by juries drawn from an
unconstitutional venire could collaterally challenge the panel, the
drain on the judicial machinery would be heavy and many prisoners
who had not been injured by the state's unlawful action might have
to be released. Because of this potential disruption to the criminal
law process, a racially neutral rule, if established at all, would almost
certainly be applied only prospectively.163 But a prospective approach
would not eradicate the racial distinctions implicit in the same class
rule; indeed, its purpose would be to preserve those distinctions for
use in habeas corpus proceedings and possibly in pending appeals.
In view of the problems inherent in overturning the same class
rule, courts may be more favorably disposed to modify it, as some
·writers have proposed, so that the arbitrary exclusion of a class
could be challenged by nonmember defendants on a showing of "potential prejudice."164 Such a modification, which could be applied
retrospectively, would protect white civil rights workers and some
minority group members against the exclusion of Negroes, but it
would not place all defendants on an equal footing. Nonmembers
339.43 (1966). This preference may reflect a hope of exploiting stereo•
types of the "Negro subculture" or a fear that Negro jurors will conform to the
views of the white majority and will arouse community racial feeling against the
defendant. Those considerations reveal still deeper sources of injustice to the Negro,
but they also indicate that an all-white jury is sometimes a safer risk for him than
one that is racially mixed.
AMERICAN JURY

161. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
162. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963): Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
163. Cf. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966): Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965).
164. See, e.g., Note, The Congress, the Court and Jury Selection: A Critique of
Titles I and 11 of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. ID:v. 1069, 1122 (1966).
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of the excluded class could invoke Strauder only in situations in
which potential prejudice was detectable. Yet our knowledge of
jury behavior and group prejudice is so limited that error in applying the proposed rule seems inevitable.165 On the other hand, a person showing membership in an arbitrarily excluded class is, without
more, entitled to a new trial. Clearly a modification of the same class
rule which requires nonmembers of an excluded class to assume
risks of error which members do not assume will perpetuate differential treatment along group lines.
The principle of Strauder and its progeny appears, therefore, to
leave little opportunity for the operation of a racially neutral standard. Those cases show that the government has power to classify
by race outside the narrow context of wartime emergency and beyond the unique circumstances of United States-Indian relations.166
The cases deal specifically with the administration of criminal justice, but the power they acknowledge is susceptible to wide application. The same class rule operates, when Negroes are excluded
from jury service, to protect Negro defendants while denying the
same protection to non-Negroes. Presumably the rationale for doing
so is that there is a rough correlation between membership in the
excluded class and probable harm at trial. 167 But if this imprecise
correlation is sufficient to justify corrective racial classification in the
administration of justice, then such classification may be arguably
permissible in other areas in which there is an equally close relationship between injury and race. Of course, the same class rule relates only to the remedy provided for unlawful selection of the jury
venire,168 and the reasons for rejecting a racially neutral use of that
remedy are compelling. It is doubtful, however, that these factors
will make the teachings of the jury cases inapposite to other fields.
Certainly racial classification in the public schools can be remedial,
and rigid adherence to color-blindness can exact a heavy price in
educational disadvantage. 169 On analysis, the jury cases seem to offer
impressive support for corrective classification by race.
165. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 160, at 465.
166. See text accompanying notes 56-86, 123-45 supra.
167. Some class members, according to this rationale, are not injured by the exclusions but most of them will be; and some nonmembers of the class may be
harmed but most will not be.
168. The selection itself is governed by a requirement of strict racial neutrality.
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
169. The action being remedied in the Strauder situation is unconstitutional,
whereas racial isolation in the schools may be lawful, albeit undesirable. But it is
difficult to read the Constitution to allow corrective racial classification in one case
and not in the other so long as the government may in both circumstances regard
the status quo as evil. Furthermore, the argument can be made that in each specific
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B. Proportional Representation
The cases which attempt to delineate specifically the right to nondiscriminatory selection of the jury venire, unlike those providing
a remedy for unlawful selection, do not imply the permissibility of
classification by race. The most instructive decision, although it did
not yield a majority opinion, is Cassell v. Texas. 170 In that case, a
Negro convicted of murder accused the county jury commissioners
of deliberately limiting Negroes selected to serve on each grand
jury in proportion to the total number of blacks available for call.
A majority of the Justices agreed that the county's jury-selection
practices were unconstitutionally discriminatory. The prevailing
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Reed for himself and three of his
brethren, based its findings of discrimination on admission by commissioners that they chose jurors exclusively from among their acquaintances and that they knew no qualified Negroes. But the
opinion was unequivocal in condemning proportional representation:
If • . . commissioners should limit proportionally the number of
Negroes selected for grand-jury service, such limitation would violate our Constitution ...•
. . . [T]he Constitution requires only a fair jury selected without
regard to race. Obviously the number of races and nationalities
appearing in the ancestry of our citizens would make it impossible to
meet a requirement of proportional representation. Similarly, since
there can be no exclusion of Negroes as a race and no discrimination
because of color, proportional limitation is not permissible.171

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by two other Justices, concurred in
judgment on the ground that "[t]he basis of selection cannot consciously take color into account."172 There was thus general agreement in Cassell that there must be neither inclusion nor exclusion
of veniremen because of race, and that states cannot purposefully
"balance" the racial composition of juries.
The effect of Cassell on the issues posed by de facto school segregation will depend largely on the rationale of the Strauder case. If
Strauder was based on the unfair or unequal treatment that members of the excluded class are thought to receive from other groups,
Cassell will be a significant obstacle to the use of racial criteria in
case, the classification relieves the consequences of unconstitutional action, even though
with respect to the schools the relationship is diffuse and more remote in time. See
note 37 supra.

170. '!,ll9 U.S. 282 (1950).
171. '!,ll9 U.S. at 286-87.
172. '!,'!,9 U.S. at 295 (concurring opinion).
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the schools. That interpretation of Strauder implies that jury representation for the defendant's class is conducive to evenhanded treatment; and if state contrivance to secure such representation is constitutionally proscribed in Cassell, notwithstanding the better brand
of justice which balanced juries are presumed to dispense, similar
efforts to control the racial composition of the schools may fail despite their potentially favorable effects.173 On the other hand, Cassell
will carry no such implication if the practice of reversing criminal
convictions is merely an expeditious way to protect the minority's
right to participate in the administration of justice, or if the process
of discriminatory selection itself induces unequal treatment. Under
those theories, proportional selection of jurors could have been forbidden simply because it did not advance the purpose of securing
nondiscriminatory treatment for either the defendant or the prospective juror. Until the basis for Strauder is clarified, the impact of
Cassell will remain uncertain.
C. The Peremptory Challenge
Swain v. Alabama174 brought before the Court the difficult question whether a state's use of peremptory challenges to exclude Negroes from jury service violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In that case, Swain, a Negro, was tried by
jury for rape of a seventeen-year-old white girl. In accordance with
Alabama's system for selecting the petit jury, a list of approximately
seventy-five veniremen was struck, twice by the defendant and once
by the prosecutor in alternation, until twelve jurors were left. Six
Negroes had been available, but they were struck by the prosecutor.
An all-white jury then found Swain guilty, and he was sentenced to
death. In the Supreme Court he contended that the state had unconstitutionally discriminated by race (1) in selecting grand jurors and
the petit jury venire, (2) by purposefully striking six Negroes at his
trial, and (3) by systematically exercising the strike over a period of
years to prevent blacks from serving on the petit jury in any case. The
first and third claims failed for lack of proof. The second was also
rejected but not because the allegation of purposeful exclusion of
Negroes was discredited.
173. The two situations, however, can be distinguished. One noteworthy difference
is that racial manipulation may be immediately self-defeating in the courts where it
draws attention to the defendant's race and away from the relevant facts, but corrective color-consciousness in the schools might not inhibit learning, In addition, a
more persuasive factual case can be made to show the adverse effect of imbalance in
education. See authorities cited in notes 160 supra and 245 and 248 infra. Nevertheless, it will not be easy to reckon with Cassell if Strauder is given this interpretation.
174. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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The Court, addressing itself to the second claim through Mr.
Justice White, readily acknowledged that the peremptory challenge
often is "exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal
proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality,
occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty."175 The
reasons for tolerating those considerations, it stated, were found in
the policy of the peremptory system-to guarantee impartiality in
appearance as well as fact:
The function of the challenge is not to eliminate extremes of
partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors
before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence
placed before them, and not otherwise. In this way the peremptory
satisfies the rule that "to perform its high function in the best way
'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' "176
According to the Court, the purpose of the peremptory system
would be frustrated if in a particular case state challenges based on
unreasonable criteria were invalidated. Nevertheless, the Court preferred to speak in terms of presumptions and unreviewability, rather
than to declare openly that prosecutors may use the challenge to
secure an all-white jury:
To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the
demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause
would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the
challenge ...•
In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the
function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the
institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of
his challenges in any given case. The presumption in any particular
case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to
obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. The
presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjected
to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes
were removed from the jury or that they were removed because they
were Negroes.177
The question whether or not a prosecutor can systematically strike
all Negroes in every case was not presented by the record, but the
Court stated that "in [such] circumstances, giving even the widest
leeway to the operation of irrational but trial-related suspicions
175. l!BO U.S. at 220.
176. l!BO U.S. at 219.
177. l!BO U.S. at 221-22.
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and antagonisms, it would appear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are being perverted."178
The Swain decision clearly leaves the states free in particular
cases to classify by race in exercising the peremptory challenge. Although the opinion speaks in terms of not subjecting the peremptory
to the customary demands of equal protection, what that statement
appears to mean is that the fourteenth amendment permits the purposeful challenge of Negroes and not as in the alien exclusion cases,
that constitutional safeguards are inapplicable.179 The rationale for
allowing consideration of race in this situation is revealing. The
Court at no time implied that a juror's race will affect his disposition of a case. Instead, the opinion suggested that some people believe racial factors to be significant, and evidently it is their beliefs
which, in the interest of apparent impartiality, justify the purposeful
exclusion of Negroes and members of other groups. Accordingly,
Swain seems to permit racially differentiated treatment to be predicated on community attitudes which are, by hypothesis, unreasonable. In view of the limited state interests at stake there,180 the
Swain case may lend support to the use of racial classifications in
other areas, including education, in which community attitudes have
an important effect and in which injustice is not merely apparent
but real.181
To be sure, Swain involved a narrow issue which has traditionally been immune from judicial review. But tradition furnishes
no adequate basis for determining the constitutionality of racial
classifications. The Swain Court, aware of the potential for abusing
178. 380 U.S. at 223-24.
179. The Court did not discuss, and at times seemed consciously to obscure, the
distinction between holding that the challenge is constitutionally permissible, and
holding that it is impermissible in principle but insulated from inquiry in order to
protect the peremptory system. A close reading of Swain, however, suggests that the
purposeful challenge of Negroes is lawful, rather than undetectably lawless. The
Court recognized that prosecutors often consider the racial affiliations of prospective
jurors and did not intimate that this consideration was at all improper. It must have
been expected that silence in this context would be understood as permissive. Moreover, the testimony of the prosecuting attorney in Swain made it plain that he himself did not disregard race in exercising the peremptory. Record at 21-22. His testimony can be reconciled with the Court's inference that the challenge was properly
used, but the explanation must be that purposeful class exclusion is allowable when
the challenge is "trial-related." See 380 U.S. at 225; note 184 infra.
180. Even with respect to the defendant "There is nothing in the Constitution of
the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges ••••"
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919), quoted with approval in Swain, 380
U.S. at 219.
181. The school system is not intended, like the peremptory, to permit official
irrationality. But if equal protection requirements can be relaxed to allow irrational
trial-related considerations in the courts, many will urge a similar result for rational
school-related considerations in education. See note 173 supra.
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the peremptory, indicated a readiness to strike down the systematic
challenge of Negroes when that challenge is used in a series of cases
in the same jurisdiction.182 Its refusal to make corresponding demands in a specific case did not stem from any difference in tradition, since the challenge has generally been insulated from review
when it is used in a series of cases as well as when it is used in
particular ones. 183 The difference turns rather on the Court's current
appraisal of the proper role of the peremptory in judicial administration. The Court apparently will bar the systematic use of the
challenge to evade Strauder, but is not prepared to invalidate the
peremptory system in order to foreclose racial limitations on jury
service. This value judgment qualifies the principle of color-blindness and produces the type of accommodation of interests which
many will consider appropriate in other fields. 184
VI.

COHABITATION AND MISCEGENATION

The Court has discussed the question of permissible classification
by race in its recent decisions concerning cohabitation and miscegegenation laws. In McLaughlin v. Florida, 185 the defendants, a black
man and a white woman, were charged with habitually occupying the
same room in violation of a Florida statute which prohibited the interracial cohabitation of unmarried couples. They moved to quash
the information on the ground that the statutory provision denied
them the equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
The state defended the statute as a means of dealing with promiscuity
and of complementing its miscegenation law. On review the Supreme
Court accepted the state's characterization of the statute and assumed
arguendo that the miscegenation law was valid; it also agreed that
the cohabitation of unmarried couples could be barred by a properly
dravm prohibition. The principal question therefore was whether
182. 380 U.S. at 223-24.
183. The peremptory challenge, when available, has usually been deemed an absolute power. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892); Hayes v. Missouri,
l::!0 U.S. 68 (1887). See also F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 196 (1949).
184. There are obvious differences between the peremptory challenge concept,
which expresses a special regard for appearances, and other uses of racial classification.
See note 181 supra. But if preservation of the peremptory system justifies the acceptance of racial disqualifications, it must be asked whether other interests, which
are entitled to at least equally high rank, might not also support classification by
race. Furthermore, Swain indicated approval, not mere tolerance, of some racially
predicated challenges, such as the practice in which "striking is done differently depending on the race of the defendant and the victim of the crime." 380 U.S. 202, 225
(1965). See note 179 supra.
185. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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state power, which might validly reach all premarital cohabitation,
could be exercised solely against interracial cohabitation.
Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court, stated initially:
Normally, the widest discretion is allowed the legislative judgment
in determining whether to attack some, rather than all, of the manifestations of the evil aimed at; and normally that judgment is given
the benefit of every conceivable circumstance which might suffice to
characterize the classification as reasonable rather than arbitrary and
invidious . . . . But we deal here with a classification based upon
the race of the participants, which must be viewed in the light of
the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official
sources in the States.1sa
In light of that statement, the state's first line of defense for the
statute fell easily. Although the Court conceded that the provision
protected Florida's concern for moral customs, the state had not
urged that promiscuous conduct was more likely to result if the
cohabiting couple was racially mixed rather than racially homogeneous, and the Court could find "no legislative conviction that promiscuity by the interracial couple presents any particular problems
requiring separate or different treatment . . . .''187 Thus, the Court
had no difficulty in answering in the negative its central inquiry as
to whether there was "some overriding statutory purpose requiring
the proscription of the specified conduct when engaged in by a
white person and a Negro, but not othenvise.''188
The state's second line of defense fared no better. The Court
recognized that the statute was rationally related to the state's miscegenation policy, but again a stringent test of constitutionality was
invoked:
There is involved here an exercise of the state police power which
trenches upon the constitutionally protected freedom from invidious
official discrimination based on race. Such a law, even though enacted
pursuant to a valid state interest, bears a heavy burden of justification, as we have said, and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.1so
Because the integrity of Florida's marriage laws could be protected
186. 379 U.S. at 191-92.
187. 379 U.S. at 193.
188. 379 U.S. at 192. The assumption implicit in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583
(1882), that equal protection requirements are met when all members of a regulated
class are treated alike, was expressly repudiated.
189. 379 U.S. at 196.
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by enforcing racially neutral bans on illicit intercourse, there was
no "necessity" for the provision at issue.180
The negative implication of 11f.cLaughlin is that states may classify
by race when this is necessary for a legitimate overriding purpose.
Understandably, the case has been viewed as supporting the use of
racial criteria to attack de facto segregation. Writers have urged that
McLaughlin enables the schools to classify racially for the purpose of
correcting imbalance,191 and one court has declared broadly that
racial classification in the schools satisfies whatever burden of justification is required.1 92
This plausible application of McLaughlin, however, overlooks
the essential ambiguity of Mr. Justice White's opinion. It is not selfevident that classification by race will serve an "overriding" purpose in the schools.193 The obj'ections of some blacks to integrated
education and the costs involved in achieving integration through
racially based measures should caution against a facile response to
competing claims.194 Nor is it clear that such measures will qualify
as "necessary." The latter term has been narrowly construed in
other areas in which it measures fundamental rights.195 Furthermore,
some progress in reducing imbalance can be realized through racially
neutral remedies, and McLaughlin does not state that racial
classifications may be employed to advance an objective which is
190. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Douglas, concurred on the ground that "it is
simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the
criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor." 379 U.S. at 198 (emphasis
added). The careful omission of any reference to federal power may have been intended
to accommodate the Japanese Relocation Cases in which Justice Douglas voted with
the Court. But if federal law making criminality turn on race is sometimes valid, it is
not as "simple" as the opinion implies to condemn state laws in such universal terms.
191. Carter, De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and Constitutional Questions Presented, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 502 (1965).
192. Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965).
193. "This higher burden requires that a state show ••• that the public interest
involved outweighs the detriments that will be incurred by the affected private parties.
In calculating the magnitude of the public need for the measure, the courts must
consider both the extent of the benefits accruing to society and the degree of risk
which will be incurred if a measure of that nature is not permitted. Similarly, the
actual costs of the measure must be determined by examining both the importance of
the individual or group rights infringed and the extent to which the measure will
have long-term adverse effects on those interests." Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1067, 1103 (1969).
194. For a description of some of these costs see notes 252, 279, and 298 infra. It
has also been argued that quality education might be better achieved by improving
de facto segregated schools than by integrating the races. See J. CONANT, SLUMS AND
SunURBs 27-32 (1961). The views of educators have undergone some change as the
effects of racial imbalance have become more fully understood, but there is still much
debate over the relative advantages of various ways to equalize educational opportunity.
195. See generally Wormuth &: Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964).

1594

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67: 1553

partially attainable in other ways. The necessity test suggests
that race cannot be made a classifying trait if other standards will
eliminate imbalance. But the test does not indicate whether racial
classifications may be utilized to achieve a better balance, and in
most circumstances that is the critical issue. 196
Reliance upon McLaughlin is also called into question by the
fact that the Court actually applied the restriction against classification by race far more rigorously in that case than it had in the past.
Earlier opinions characterized racial distinctions as "suspect" and
subject to "rigid scrutiny."197 But those generalities had neither foreclosed all racial lines nor confined their use to situations in which
alternative measures were certain to fail. The close review in 1'1cLaughlin is especially revealing in light of the state's undisputed
power to proscribe premarital cohabitation. The objection to the
Florida statute was based solely on its underinclusiveness, a defect
that is ordinarily subject to "the widest discretion." 198 Since the miscegenation provision was assumed to be valid, the usual requirement
that an underinclusive classification be supported by fair reasons
might have been met in the case of interracial cohabitation. Under
that assumption, the state could well have concluded that the risks
of illegitimacy involved in the cohabitation of couples who are prohibited from intermarrying call for special treatment. Moreover, if
the miscegenation law is accepted as valid, racially mixed couples
might be treated differently for whatever reasons underlie that law.
These considerations could not save the cohabitation statute and
did not require full examination of the miscegenation issue but only
because the Court applied so stringent a standard to test the classification. Adoption of such a restricted view of permissible classification
by race cannot easily be reconciled with the nation of increased tolerance for racial lines.
The questions concerning the constitutionality of miscegenation
laws, which McLaughlin purported to reserve, were answered in
sweeping terms by Loving v. Virginia. 199 The Lovings, a white man
and a black woman, were married in the District of Columbia and
shortly thereafter made their home in Virginia, where both had been
residents immediately before the marriage. They were indicted on
charges of violating a Virginia statute which read:
196. It might be possible to invoke McLaughlin by defining the objective in terms
of changing the Negro-white ratio by some precise percentage, but the fictive quality
of that approach is transparent.
197. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1949).
198. 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
199. 388 U.S. l (1967).
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If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for
the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning,
and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it,
cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in
[this state's anti-miscegenation statute], and the marriage shall be
governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in this
State.200

The miscegenation law cited in this statute prohibited the intermarriage of any "white person" with any "colored person."201 The
defendants were sentenced on pleas of guilty to a year in jail,
but the sentences were suspended for twenty-five years on the condition that they leave the state and not return during that period of
time. Four years later the Lovings filed a motion to vacate judgment
on grounds that the Virginia statutes denied them due process and
equal protection, and ultimately the issues were taken to the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court, relying heavily on
the McLaughlin case, disposed of those issues and of all miscegenation laws in a few paragraphs. In the Court's view, the fact that
the statutes restricted freedom of whites as well as of blacks was insufficient to satisfy the demands of equal protection since the provisions classified racially. Classification by race, the Court implied,
may be unconstitutional per se:
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial
classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to
the "most rigid scrutiny" ... and, if they are ever to be upheld, they
must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination
which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.202
As in the School Segregation Cases, the legislative history of the
fourteenth amendment was found to be "inconclusive." But unlike
Brown, the Loving opinion made no use of available social science
evidence. Instead the Court brusquely announced that miscegenation
laws are constitutionally unjustified:
200. VA. CODE ANN, § 20-58 (1960), repealed, Act of April 2, 1968, ch. 318, § 2,
(1968] Acts of Assembly 428.
201. The latter term was defined by the statutes as a person "in whom there is
ascertainable any Negro blood," VA. CODE ANN. § 1-14 (1966), and the former as one
having "no trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54
(1960). But persons having "one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian
and having no other non-Caucasic blood" were deemed "white,'' and those having
"one-fourth or more of Indian blood and less than one-sixteenth of Negro blood" were
deemed tribal Indians. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-14 (1966).
202. 388 U.S. I, II (1967). The word "they" seems to refer to all racial classifications
rather than only to those incorporated in criminal statutes.
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There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent
of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.
The fact that Virginia only prohibits interracial marriages involving
white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand
on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy .... There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom
to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.203
Such laws, the Chief Justice added, also abridge the liberty secured
by the due process clause.
Whatever importance Loving may have in destroying a symbol
of racial separateness, it contributes relatively little toward resolving issues of classification by race. The Court's reference to a per se
rule is unlikely to have any appreciable impact in the face of
contrary precedent and in the absence of reasoned discussion. Aside
from that reference, Loving merely reiterates the McLaughlin standard without amplifying it. As might be expected, the application
of this flexible formula yielded appealing results in the immediate
case, but offered scant guidance for the future. 204 Indeed, since the
Court identified the disputed classification with a design to maintain white supremacy, the decision offers virtually no guidance at
all for cases involving "non-invidious" uses of racial criteria.

VII.

ENCOURAGING AND DISCOURAGING PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION

A. Anti-Discrimination Laws
Federal and state anti-discrimination laws, which bear tangentially on the question of permissible classification by race, have consistently been upheld by the Supreme Court. The leading case is
203. 388 U.S. at ll-12. The Court expressly disclaimed any reliance on Virginia's
failure to extend the miscegenation bar to nonwhites, and it ruled the statutes invalid "even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the 'integrity' of all
races." 388 U.S. at II n.ll.
204. The adaptability of McLaughlin is illustrated by the number of options available to the Court in overturning the convictions in Loving. The Court could have
struck down Virginia's evasion statute without passing on the miscegenation law,
exactly as McLaughlin had done; since a racially neutral provision operating against
all couples ineligible to marry in Virginia would fully protect state interests. Alternatively, the Court could have held that Virginia's miscegenation law, which prohibited
only miscegenetic marragies involving whites, served no legitimate purpose because
it did not "protect" other races or because such protection is not a proper governmental functioh. The latter rationale would have required the Court to deal with
conflicting expert opinion on whether the effects of psychological pressures on miscegenetic families justify regulations; the former would have reached only the Virginia
statutes. By drawing an easy inference that miscegenation laws do not serve an "overriding" purpose, the Court managed both to address itself to miscegenation laws
in general and to avoid a full discussion of the interests they allegedly safeguarded.
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Railway Mail Association v. Corsi.205 At issue in that case was the
validity of a state statute which prohibited labor unions from denying
membership to any person because of race, color, or creed. A New
York City branch of a postal clerks' organization sought a declaration
that the statute infringed rights of due process guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. The Court easily rejected that contention:
A judicial determination that such legislation violated the Fourteenth Amendment would be a distortion of the policy manifested in
that amendment, which was adopted to prevent state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color.
We see no constitutional basis for the contention that a state cannot protect workers from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color
or creed by an organization, functioning under the protection of the
state, which holds itself out to represent the general business needs
of employees.206
Since Corsi involved a government employer and a metropolitan
branch of the union, it was to be expected that the decision would
result either in desegregating or in dismantling the organization.207
The case thus indicates that a ban on private discrimination which
has the probable effect of compelling desegregation, and thereby restricting the associational freedom of those who would otherwise
discriminate, is constitutionally valid.208 Nevertheless, Corsi should
not be read for the broad proposition that states may force private
groups--and a fortiori, the public schools--to integrate. Such an
interpretation confuses nondiscrimination, which the New York
statute required, with integration, which the statute might have
achieved but did not command. Anti-discrimination laws are entirely
consistent with governmental neutrality toward integration,209 and
the cases sustaining them do not control the validity of measures to
correct imbalance through racial classification. The statutes classify
racially only in the sense that they single out race as an impermissible basis for private discrimination, while leaving other arbitrary
205. 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
206. 326 U.S. at 93-94.
207. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commn. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372
U.S. 714, 721 (1963) (declaring official job discrimination to be unconstitutional).
208. To the same effect see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964), and cases cited therein.
209. The primary purpose of an anti-discrimination policy is to promote equal
opportunity; the effect of the policy on racial interaction, even assuming full enforcemer.t, will vary. Often nondiscrimination !'•oduces integration, but occasionally it may
inhibit efforts to integrate. Cf. Hughi>:; v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), which
upheld a state court injunction ap:nst picketing for the purpose of inducing an employer to hire Negro workers j~ proportion to Negro customers.
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differentiation unregulated. This distinction, however, presents no
serious classification problem.

B. Official Designation of Race
Unlike anti-discrimination laws, racial designations raise substantial constitutional problems in a variety of fields. The post-Brown
Court first encountered this issue in Anderson v. Martin. 210 In that
case two Negro candidates for the school board in East Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, sought an injunction against the enforcement of a state
statute requiring that all nomination papers and ballots in public
elections indicate the race of each candidate. Characterizing the purpose of the statute as "purely racial," the Supreme Court rejected
an attempt to justify the provision as a means of informing the
electorate: "We see no relevance in the State's pointing up the race
of the candidate as bearing upon his qualifications for office."211 The
Court held unanimously that the compulsory designation of race on
the ballot was repugnant to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment:
[B]y placing a label on a candidate at the most crucial stage in the
electoral process-the instant before the vote is cast-the State furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to
operate against one group because of race and for another . . . .
Hence, in a State or voting district where Negroes predominate, that
race is likely to be favored by a racial designation on the ballot,
while in those communities where other races are in the majority,
they may be preferred. The vice lies not in the resulting injury but
in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification
that induces racial prejudice at the polls.212
The Supreme Court's decision in Anderson, however, should be
considered together with its holding in Tancil v. Woolls. 213 The
plaintiffs in the latter case sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the enforcement of several Virginia statutes which required
public officials to designate race on certain records and to separate
some listings racially. A three-judge federal district court struck
down provisions calling for notations of race and for racially separated entries on voting and property records:
[T]hey serve no other purpose than to classify and distinguish official
210. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
211. 375 U.S. at 403.
212. 375 U.S. at 402.
213. 379 U.S. 19 (1964), afj'g Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp.
156 (E.D. Va. 1964) (per curiam).
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records on the basis of race or color .... The infirmity of the provisions ... lies in their mandate of separation of names by race.214
It upheld a statute directing that every decree of divorce recite
the race of the parties, stating that "[v]ital statistics, obviously, are
aided"215 thereby. The controlling principle was expressed in terms
of the legislative purpose:
Of course, the designation of race, just as sex or religious denominations, may in certain records serve a useful purpose, and the
procurement and compilation of such information by State authorities cannot be outlawed per se. For example, the securing and
chronicling of racial data for identification or statistical use violates
no constitutional privilege. If the purpose is legitimate, the reason
justifiable, then no infringement results.216
But the district court evaded the most interesting question in the
case when it declined to apply this rule to the racial designations,
without more, on voting and property records. Since those notations
would have aided vital statistics no less than the notations on divorce
decrees, but were far more susceptible to misuse, they presented a
crucial test for the court's general principle. Rather than meet that
test, the court read the designation provisions in conjunction with
other sections of the Virginia Code which called for separate listings
of whites and Negroes. 217 So viewed, the provisions were infected
by a "mandate of separation" and were held unenforceable insofar
as they required officials "to note and show separately the names of
... white or colored persons."218 In the Supreme Court the judgment
was affirmed without opinion or citation of authority.219
Tancil and Anderson offer few fresh insights into the question of
permissible classification by race. The racial classifications in these
cases, unlike the classifications in the several lines of decisions considered above, did not impose racially differentiated treatment on
214. Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Va.
1964) (court's emphasis).
215. 230 F. Supp. at 158.
216. 230 F. Supp. at 158.
217. Section 58-790 of the Virginia Code, directing assessors to note race, was
treated together with § 58-804, requiring the Department of Taxation to maintain separate land books. Section 24-118, authorizing counties to keep voter registration lists on serially numbered cards or loose leaf binders with different colored sheets
for whites and Negroes, was invalidated even though it seemed to incorporate only
racial designations. Perhaps this requirement was deemed to be tainted by § 24-28
which required the State Board of Elections to maintain racially separated lists.
These provisions are now found in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-28, 24-118, 58-790, 58-804
(1969).
218. Quoted from the final order of the court in 9 RACE REI.. L. REP. 919, 921
(1964).
219. !179 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam).

1600

1\f.ichigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:1553

any person.220 But although the state's action did not vary with the
race of the individual, there was a danger that the notations on the
ballot might encourage racially differentiated action by voters. The
decision in the Anderson case afforded the traditional protection
against this official involvement in racial discrimination. The Supreme Court ruled that the validity of the statute did not depend on
which race was disadvantaged, and that the states should not use
race as a shorthand indicator of other factors, such as personal beliefs
and experience, which are themselves quite relevant. Tancil, on the
other hand, held that the notation on divorce decrees was a valid
racial classification. That case may provide authority for state decisions requiring school officials to conduct a racial census,221 although even that prospect is uncertain in view of the Supreme
Court's ambiguous disposition of Virginia's other race notations. In
any event, the validity of corrective action in the schools is not illuminated by a judgment sustaining only the collection of some data.
It is possible that greater significance will emerge from these
cases when the basis for the result in Tancil is explained.222 For
the present, there is clarity only at two extremes: racial designations
are prohibited on the ballot, where they threaten serious harm; and
they are allowable on divorce decrees, where they serve legitimate
state aims. In many situations, however, race notations will be both
useful and threatening. For example, governmental power to gather
racial data is vital to the integrity of anti-discrimination laws,223 and
the exercise of such a power was apparently contemplated by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.224 Yet the same data which help an official
enforcement agency to detect discrimination may sometimes aid
220. See notes 263-97 infra regarding the distinction between racially differentiated
treatment of individuals and other types of racial classifications.
221. School Comm. of New Bedford v. Commissioner of Educ., 349 Mass. 410, 208
N.E.2d 814 (1965). For a case sustaining such a census in the context of de jure segregation, see Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd per
curiam sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
222. Tancil v. Woolls is a classic example of what should not be decided per
curiam. There is no way of knowing whether the Supreme Court's action meant that
the racial designations on voting and property records were unconstitutional or
whether it meant that, as the lower court had decided, the records were unlawfully
segregated. And if the designations themselves were invalid, there is no way of knowing why. The district court measured the validity of official race notations by the
legitimacy and justifiability of their purpose, a test similar to that later adopted in
the McLaughlin case. But there is little discernable difference in purpose between
noting race on a divorce decree and noting it on various other records. A test drawn
in these terms, like the distinction between direct and indirect legal effects, may serve
the function "of stating, rather than of reaching, a result." Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 123 (1942).
223. See M. SOVERN, UGAL REsTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
125-27 (1966).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1964). See M. SOVERN, supra note 223, at 85-89.
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private employers who wish to practice it.225 Under these circumstances it is a fair guess that, while safeguards will have to be developed, they will not take the form of a complete ban on the collection of racial information. But since no compromise can entirely
prevent misuse of the data, 226 this problem illustrates the need for
flexibility even when racial classifications carry some risk.

VIII.

PERCENTAGE REQUIREMENTS IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

In United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education221
the Supreme Court approved for the first time the use of percentage requirements in disestablishing de jure segregated school systems.
That case, the latest in a series of decisions implementing Brown,
involved the assignment of faculty and staff members in Montgomery County, Alabama. Suit was originally filed in a federal district
court in 1964, and findings were entered which showed that teachers
as well as students were assigned to local schools strictly on the basis
of race. After issuing a number of orders for desegregation of the
student body, the federal court directed the school board to end faculty segregation in the 1966 academic year.228 Nevertheless, in 1968
when motions were heard which culminated in the order which was
reviewed by the Supreme Court, the district judge found extensive
evidence of continued discriminatory practices. New schools had
been constructed, existing schools expanded, and transportation and
athletic programs maintained in a manner wholly calculated to
perpetuate the dual system of education. With respect to faculty and
staff assignments-the only aspect of the dispute to reach the Supreme Court-the evidence of willful segregation was unmistakable.
Negro substitute teachers had been employed more than 1,500 times
during the previous semester and in every instance had been assigned
to traditionally Negro schools; white substitutes had been employed
more than 2,000 times, with only token assignments to nonwhite
schools. The pattern for night school and for student and full-time
teaching staffs was much the same. In all, about 1,365 teachers served
225. This is especially true when the employer engages in quota hiring in order
to protect himself against a charge of discrimination. See ·winter, Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against Discrimination: A Reply to Professor
Sovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 817 (1967).
226. Those who believe that the principal danger lies in state and local collection
of racial data may seek refuge in the doctrine of pre-emption, at least so far as employment records are concerned. The inevitable cost of doing so will be the diminished effectiveness of state anti-discrimination laws.
227. 395 U .s. 225 (1969).
228. The board was later allowed one more year for compliance. A detailed factual
account of the Montgomery County litigation may be found in the memorandum
opinion of the district court. 289 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
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in Montgomery County, and approximately 1,333 were assigned to
faculties composed predominantly of members of their own race.
Against the background of this response to the general mandate
for desegregation, the district judge "concluded that a more specific
order would be appropriate ... to establish the minimum amount
of progress that would be required for the future." 229 He therefore
announced an "ultimate objective in faculty desegregation" calling
for the ratio of white to Negro teachers, then about 3 to 2 for the
system as a whole, to be "substantially the same" in each school. To
begin implementing this goal, he ordered that the following year at
least one-sixth of the regular teachers and staff in each school be
members of their faculty's racial minority, although schools with
fewer than twelve teachers were required to have only one or more
members of the minority race. The ratio of white to black substitute,
night, and student teachers was to be substantially the same in each
school. On review, the court of appeals agreed that the school board
had failed to comply with general orders to desegregate the faculty
and that there was "a need for specific directives in the instant
case," 230 but it modified some of the ratios adopted by the district
judge.
The Supreme Court characterized the issues between the parties,
which reflected the differences in the lower court orders, as "exceedingly narrow" and resolved them virtually without legal discussion. The Court made passing references to the school board's
"responsibility to achieve integration as rapidly as practicable"281
and stressed that the ratios in question were not intended to be
rigid and inflexible. It then stated that the order of the district judge
would "expedite, by means of specific commands, the day when a
completely unified, unitary, nondiscriminatory school system becomes a reality instead of a hope." 232 With that observation, it remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit and directed that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.
There are obvious aspects of color-consciousness in the Montgomery County case,233 but, contrary to some impressions carried
in the popular press,234 the decision does not validate the allocation
of government jobs or of any other official benefit on the basis of
229. 395 U.S. 225, 232 (1969).
230. 400 F.2d 1, 6 (5th Cir. 1968).
231. 395 U.S. 225, 230 (1969). But see text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. Previous
cases had identified the goal somewhat more vaguely as a "unitary" school system.
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
232. 395 U.S. 225, 235 (1969).
233. See note 237 infra.
234. TIME, June 13, 1969, at 66.
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race. Both the district court and the Supreme Court defended the
use of ratios as a means of assuring desegregation through more specific orders, and neither intimated that teachers would be subjected
to racially differentiated treatment. The history of the Montgomery
County litigation attested to the inadequacy of general mandates;
in fact, some school officials had themselves indicated a need for
more precise instructions. The use of ratios in these circumstances
followed the course taken by the Fifth Circuit a year earlier when it
accepted the Guidelines of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare as "a general rule of thumb or objective administrative
guide for measuring progress in desegregation ...." 235 The ratios,
like the Guidelines, were designed to induce compliance with Brown
and not to legitimate the discriminatory allotment of official benefits
or burdens. This point was made clear, not only by the repeated
insistence in the Montgomery County opinions that the ratios specifically define rather than modify Brown ll's mandate for a "nondiscriminatory school system," but also by other features of the
district court's desegregation plan. For that plan required unequivocally that potential burdens, such as the displacements of
teachers, be administered on a nonracial basis:
Teachers and other professional staff members will not be discriminatorily assigned, dismissed, demoted, or passed over for retention, promotion, or rehiring, on the ground of race or color .... If,
as a result of desegregation, there is to be a reduction in the total
professional staff of the school system, the qualifications of all staff
members in the system will be evaluated in selecting the staff member to be released without consideration of race or color.236
In this connection, it is crucial to recognize that all of the court's
ratio requirements can be satisfied through a racially neutral assignment of school personnel. Since 60 per cent of the county's teachers
are white and 40 per cent are black, compliance with the order for
a minimum minority ratio of one-in-six among the regular faculty
can surely be effected without subjecting teachers to racially differentiated treatment. Indeed, the laws of probability make it difficult not
to attain that ratio if teaching assignments are genuinely nonracial.
And the laws of probability likewise demonstrate that racially neutral action can produce "substantially the same" ratio of white to
black substitute, night, and student teachers in each school.237 What
235. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 886-87 (1966),
aff'd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
236. 12 RACE REL. L. REP. 1200, 1205-06 (1967).
237. "Racially neutral action" refers to treatment of teachers. This term, however,
does not imply a school policy which is "neutral" in the sense of being indifferent to
the racial composition of various faculties. For example, a random assignment plan and
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Montgomery County requires therefore is that the school board stop
its discriminatory practices, not that it initiate new ones.
It is conceivable, of course, that the future use of ratios in dismantling dual school systems may involve differential treatment
based on race. If ratios become "rigid and inflexible"-qualities
which the Supreme Court took pains to note were absent in Montgomery County-they may be unattainable by neutral means. Attempts will probably then be made to distinguish between imposing
racially focused burdens as a corrective for de jure segregation and
imposing them for other reasons. 238 The pressure to adopt this rationale and to prescribe more severe ratios will be intense so long
as the promise of the school cases remains unfulfilled. Whether local
intransigence will persuade the Supreme Court to order racially differentiated treatment of students and teachers in a final effort to
implement Brown cannot be prophesied, but that step was not taken
in the Montgomery County case.

IX.

GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The discussion above shows that the decisions of the Supreme
Court do not establish a rigid principle of constitutional colora free choice plan might both be racially neutral toward teachers; but if the school
board chose between those plans, it would have to be mindful of their comparative
impact on segregation. There is thus an important element of color-consciousness in
Montgomery County, an element which is implicit in any affirmative effort to desegre•
gate. But there are vast differences between achieving desegregation through racially
differentiated burdens and achieving it through the uniform treatment of all races. See
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966), affd
en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967), on which the trial
judge in the instant case placed heavy reliance, which stated that "a classification that
denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be based on race." To the
extent that attacks on imbalance in northern schools involve racially predicated burdens, as they often do, the Montgomery County case is readily distinguishable. See
note 262 infra regarding other color-conscious attempts to alleviate imbalance.
The Montgomery County Board of Education will have considerable latitude in
selecting faculty desegregation measures, since the dual school system must have produced both white and black teachers for each grade and for each subject. The Board
is unlikely to resort to completely random assignment, although this would yield the
required results; but other racially neutral measures, including random assignment
of the teachers with lowest seniority, could be highly effective. The Board's own plans,
in fact, contemplated nearly as much integration as is now required, 289 F. Supp. 647,
658 (M.D. Ala. 1968), despite an apparent policy of retaining most teachers in their
present schools-a policy which cannot be deemed nonracial since it acquiesces in past
discriminatory appointments.
238. The judicial supervision exercised over the disestablishment of dual school
systems has been advanced as a basis for distinguishing. Developments in the LawEqual Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1067, 1108-09 n.192 (1969). The flexible standard
set forth in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), might also be used to accom•
modate the distinction. See notes 185-96 supra and accompanying text. And finally,
Montgomery County may quite possibly be read for more than it is worth. For an
analysis of racially differentiated treatment outside the context of de jure segregation
see notes 263-90 infra and accompanying text.
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blindness. Rather, the opinions, although not yielding a clear neutral
principle, suggest that in appropriate circumstances-usually described in terms of "justification"-the state and national governments may classify by race. The value of the cases as precedent for
such classification in de facto segregated schools is varied; but even
if the decisions were more uniformly apposite, policy considerations
would inevitably affect the ultimate disposition of the problem. The
remainder of this Article will therefore deal with some of those considerations.230 It will focus on the validity of purposeful integration
in principle and on the ways in which that objective may be advanced.240 A concluding section will examine black separatism as
an alternative route to educational equality.

A. Purposeful School Integration in Principle
The threshold question is whether or not the racial composition
of the schools is a valid governmental concern. A negative answer to
that question, unlike a ruling that particular measures are improper
because they intrude on constitutionally protected rights, would
deliver a fatal blow to all conscious efforts to integrate de facto segregated schools. The issue requires discussion of the effects of racial
and social class isolation on student attitudes and achievement, as
well as a consideration of specific objections to purposeful integration
in princi pie.
Correction of imbalance in the public schools will produce both
racial interaction and social class interaction, and recent studies
have documented the favorable effects of those contacts. The Coleman Report,241 prepared for the Office of Education in response to
a Congressional mandate for a national survey of educational opportunity, found that pupil achievement varies directly with the
social class level of the student body. It concluded:
Attribu.tes of other students account for far more variation in the
239. These factors are crucial not only because of their impact on education but
also because of their potential applicability to racial classifications in other areas,
including employment and housing. Federal power to enforce the fourteenth amendment in these fields is extensive under Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), but
that case did not remove the restraints on official classification by race. But cf. Developments, supra note 238, at 1109-11.
240. The term "purposeful integration" refers to action that has the purpose and
effect of producing racial balance, as distinguished from action which achieves a
fortuitous balance but which is adopted to effectuate nonracial policies. If integration is an allowable state goal-that is, permissible "in principle"-debate will then
center on methods of implementation.
241. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF EDUCATION,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY ij. Coleman ed. 1966) [hereinafter COLEMAN
REPORT].
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achievement of minority group children than do any attributes of
school facilities and slightly more than do attributes of staff.
In general, as the educational aspirations and backgrounds of fellow students increase, the achievement of minority group children
increases.242
Furthermore the higher achievement of minority group children
in schools with a higher social class level is not offset by commensurate disadvantage to the more privileged students; 243 rather, it
appears that "in a school containing a mixture of lower and middle
class children the total educational product is greater than if the
classes were segregated.''244 The evidence in the Report, together
with corroborative data gathered in other investigations,2415 is more
than adequate to substantiate the state's interest in the social class
composition of the schools.246 This interest in turn can be said to
support the validity of integrating by race, since racial balance will
tend to produce social class balance. The indirect impact of race
distribution was described in the Coleman Report, which stated
(1) that the achievement of each racial group increases as the proportion of white students in the school increases, and (2) that
this resulted "not from racial composition per se, but from the
better educational background and higher educational aspirations
that are, on the average, found among white students."247
It may be unnecessary, however, to rely on the inexact and transient relationship between race and social class as a basis for purposeful integration. A direct correlation between racial balance and
student performance was disclosed on re-analysis of the Coleman
Report data by the United States Civil Rights Commission.248 The
Commission, while agreeing that social class level influences performance, stated that the racial composition of the student body has
a separate differential effect.249 The apparent conflict between the
latter conclusion and Dr. Coleman's conjecture on the same subject
242. Id. at 302 (emphasis omitted).
243. Id. at 297, 304-05.
244. Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 157, 209 (1963).
245. See, e.g., Wilson, Educational Consequences of Segregation in a California
Community, in app. C-3, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE
Ptmuc SCHOOLS (1967); Wilson, Residential Segregation of Social Classes and Aspirations of High School Boys, 24 AM. Soc. REv. 836 (1959). Criticisms of Dr. Coleman's
procedures have failed to take account of these confirmatory studies.
246. See Kaplan, supra note 244.
247. COLEMAN REPORT 307.
248. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(1967) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
249. Id. at 91, 204.
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does not militate against holding that racial balance is a permissible objective. Courts have deferred to the legislature on threshold
questions in other areas, despite conflicting evidence from the social
sciences,250 and this seems entirely proper, for the task of choosing
between plausible opposing views in defining governmental objectives is primarily for the legislative branch.251 In light of the limits
of existing knowledge, an official determination· that racial interaction improves the educational product of the school system is entitled to similar respect in the Supreme Court.252
But even if closer review is dictated by the racial nature of the
purpose to integrate, the results should be the same. Assuming that
the evidence is too fragmentary to prove that racial isolation per se
influences student performance, other adverse effects of segregation
will provide important cumulative support. First, studies have demonstrated that predominantly Negro schools are often academically
undernourished. The Coleman Report and the Commission Report
show that Negro students generally have access to fewer books and
laboratories, attend larger classes, are taught by less capable instructors, and have fewer curricular and extracurricular programs available to them. 253 Some of these deficiencies may be caused by willful
state discrimination; others may reflect the interests of students or a
preference among teachers for middle class schools. In any event, the
problem might reasonably be attacked by integrating the student
body. Racial integration would help to insulate minorities both
250. See the separate opinions of Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 546-47 (1961) (dissenting opinion), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 501-02
(1957) (concurring opinion), which note the deference given to legislative judgments
concerning marriage, abortion, sterilization, euthanasia, and similar subjects.
251. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929); McLean v.
Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909).
252. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 34!! U.S. 250, 262 (1952). Admittedly, integration
can be detrimental in the short term. Some children have not been prepared for the
demands of integrated schools and may experience losses in performance and selfesteem. The states are entitled, however, to look beyond the immediate effects of
integration in fixing public policy. It has also been found that "schools bring little
influence to bear on a child's achievement that is independent of his background and
general social context." COLEMAN REPORT 325. This finding may reflect the emphasis
placed on a schoolwide analysis rather than on specific classrooms within the schools, .
which some have considered a more relevant context. See COMMISSION REPORT, app.
C-1. In any event, the states may properly decide to exert whatever influence they
have in favor of improving the education of each student. In doing so, however, they
should recognize that (1) the adverse effects of integration may preclude the differential
treatment of Negro children over the objection of their parents, and (2) the finding
that schools have a minimal impact on achievement calls for a re-examination
of the casual assumption that the government"s educational function is vastly more
important than its other functions.
25!!. COLEMAN REPORT 9, 12; COMMISSION REPORT 92-94. The extent of the disparities and their effects on student achievement were less than had been assumed.
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against discriminatory allocation of resources and against fortuitous
disadvantages emanating from faculty or student preferences. Second, there is evidence that segregated education impedes understanding between the races and contributes to mutual fear and
hostility. White persons who attend integrated schools are found to
be generally more receptive to adult contacts with Negroes, and
Negro children in such schools are less likely to develop attitudes
which alienate them from the rest of society.254 Racially balanced
schools may thus tend to interrupt the self-perpetuating process by
which segregated education reinforces segregated employment and
housing patterns, and is in turn reinforced by them. Finally, state
concern over racial imbalance might be justified by subjective considerations analogous to those which prevailed in Swain v. Alabama.255 If, for example, Negro students interpret de facto segregation as implying the superiority of the white race, it is likely that
their self-esteem and motivation will suffer. In the long run those
subjective feelings may impair achievement, whether or not this is
indicated by current testing. 256
Yet in spite of the potential academic advantages of integrated
schools, racial separatists, both white and black, may urge that purposeful integration is objectionable in principle because of its impact on other values. Some Negroes argue that integration restricts
their freedom of association, adversely affects black culture, and impairs the black student's self-image and sense of security. Claims by
whites, perhaps more accurately described as fears, appear to be
based on alleged negative effects on integrated education on middle
class students.
Although the objections which blacks advance against purposeful integration are forceful, it should be recognized that some of
these claims were implicitly rejected by the School Segregation Cases.
Those cases, though dealing primarily with the desire of southern
whites not to associate with Negroes, necessarily restrict also the
freedom of blacks who prefer not to associate with whites. Indeed,
one of the arguments repeatedly advanced for segregation was that
Negroes themselves wanted separate facilities. That argument had
self-serving overtones, but it was widely acknowledged that for many
254. COMMISSION REPORT 109-10.
255. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
256. "A frequently postulated cause of tlie low achievement levels of Negro youtlis
is tlieir pessimistic view of tlieir own ability to do better. This discouraging view is
presumably an inte:cnalization of a social definition of tlieir own wortlI." Wilson,
Educational Consequences of Segregation in a California Community, in COMMISSION
REPORT, app. C-3, at 192.
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Negroes the implementation of Brown and its progeny would mean
some loss of security and a considerable degree of compulsory association with nonblacks. 257 Moreover, it was clear even prior to
Brown that states have the power to enforce racially neutral attendance plans which incidentally increase integration; and while this
does not establish the validity of purposeful integration, it responds
sufficiently to the claim of associational freedom.
A number of objections by whites to integration in principle
are either tenuous or predicated on transitional difficulties. Social
science evidence does not support the charges that integration will
seriously depress the academic performance of white students or that
it will produce lasting abrasiveness between the integrated groups.258
Similar opposition, based on the apprehension that white children
will be unfavorably "influenced" by Negroes, is basically an expression of white supremacy; those fears are no more persuasive as a
basis for denying civil rights in schools than they were with respect
to housing, jobs, and public accommodations.259
Other objections to purposeful integration, although not tenuous, are addressed to problems that are sometimes encountered in
integrated education but far from inherent in it. The threat to
black culture and to the self-image of black students which has
been perceived in integrated schooling is certainly not a necessary
part of it. Objections of this kind speak to grievous but remediable
defects, and not to integration in principle. Black spokesmen have
often recognized this fact and have carefully stated their position
in terms of "integration as it is currently practiced."260 In any event,
257. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), which rejected freedom
of choice when other school plans would lead to more effective desegregation.
258. For a concrete example of school integration which is said to have had neither
of these effects, see Sullivan, Implementing Equal Education Opportunity, 38 HARV.
Eouc. REv. 148, 150-51 (1968).
259. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., ~92 U.S. 409 (1968); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
260. s. CARMICHAEL &: C. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER 55 (1967). Unlike integrated
housing, which some blacks see as destroying the political and cultural strength of the
Negro community, school integration leaves most aspects of the student's life open
to any all-black activities he and his parents desire. If integrated schools do their
job properly, and if black organizations continue their efforts to increase black pride,
the child's self-image and cultural heritage need not be threatened. The current drive
for black identity, it should be remembered, did not originate in the public schools,
and the momentum of that drive will probably be easier to sustain than it was to
develop.
Nevertheless there are obvious lessons to be drawn from Negro criticisms of integration. If plans to achieve racial balance do not also include remedies for the stated
defects, they may lose the indispensable support of the black community and may
aggravate rather than redress educational deficiencies.
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it seems likely that even blacks who now favor separatism would
find no profit in a decision that invalidated in a single stroke all
attempts at purposeful integration by holding it impermissible in
principle. A black separatist can easily address his objections to particular measures which he deems undesirable without attacking the
constitutionality of purposeful integration-a strategy which will intrude far less on the freedom of other blacks to choose for themselves and on his own freedom to take a different course should he
later wish to do so.261 The movement for racial equality has undergone numerous tactical changes in a brief period of time, and no one
can safely assume that there will not be future changes. It seems
consistent with the need for flexibility; and with the ultimate goals
of racial justice, to hold that purposeful integration is permissible in
principle and then to inquire into the validity of specific proposals.262
B. Methods of Correcting Racial Imbalance
Although the states have a legitimate interest in the racial composition of the schools, it does not necessarily follow that they may
employ racially differentiated means to advance that interest. Proposals for correcting imbalance vary widely both in their capacity to
cope with the problem and in the legal issues they present.263 These
proposals can be divided into three categories. One involves di£261. Black spokesmen of every persuasion have been careful to preserve options
and to insist that the decision of Negroes who seek integration "be supported and
enforced by the entire American structure." F. McKISSICK, THREE-FIFTHS OF A MAN,
153 (1969). A contrary view, repudiating all efforts at purposeful integration, would
subject Negroes in some parts of the country to needless hardship and would give great
encouragement to those who wish to do nothing about racial inequality. On the other
hand, certain programs, such as bussing black children far out of their neighborhood,
have sometimes been opposed because they inhibit parental participation in the child's
education. Hamilton, Race and Education: A Search for Legitimacy, 38 HARV. Eouc.
REV. 669, 677 (1968).
262. Purposeful integration seems to be required by United States v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969), in formerly de jure segregated school systems.
See notes 231 and 237 supra. Perhaps this type of racial classification is peculiarly
"necessary" in that context because of the history of southern resistance to Brown. See
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). It would be anomalous, however, to hold
that purposeful integration is required in the South and not even permissible else•
where. More probably, the Court will hold that racial classifications are generally less
objectionable when they merely define governmental objectives than when they arc
used to allocate benefits or burdens on the basis of color-a distinction applicable to
cases of racial imbalance.
263. See generally Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection and "The Rule
in Shelley's Case", 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 531 (1963); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw.
U. L. REv. 363 (1966); Navasky, The Benevolent I:lousing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30
(1960). See also Bittker, supra note 143; Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools:
The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HAAv. L. REv. 564 {1965).
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ferential treatment of individuals on the basis of race, such as
permitting only Negroes to transfer out of ghetto schools. The
other two types of remedies classify groups rather than individuals,264
and though calling for less discussion on the question of constitutionality, they may ultimately prove to be more important and more
feasible measures.
With regard to the first category, all of the reasons which support
the objective of integrating the schools are relevant in determining
whether, as a means to that end, the states may subject individuals
to racially differentiated treatment. In addition, it is often urged
that the history of discrimination against Negroes makes continuing
differential treatment appropriate. This argument, which implies a
duty rather than freedom to take corrective action, is twofold. It
relies first on the government's past complicity in racial discrimination. Official enforcement of restrictive covenants, of segregation,
and of other discriminatory practices is said to warrant corrective
measures based on race. Second, the argument relies on the manifest
privation of Negroes, asserting that because of past prejudice they
cannot now achieve equality without compensatory treatment. 265 A
color-blind government, it is contended, cannot satisfy present needs,
much less redress accumulated grievances; instead the government
must make allowance for the special treatment of those who were
disadvantaged by more than a century of color-consciousness.
These contentions have great moral appeal, but they overlook
many of the risks inherent in racially differentiated treatment-risks
which are especially grave to Negroes and members of other minority
groups. Such treatment, even though intended to neutralize discrimination and to achieve educational equality, may actually generate more private prejudice. Blacks as well as whites may instinctively attribute the preferential treatment of a minority race to a
low assessment of its capabilities. Racially predicated governmental
action may thereby appear to confirm the folklore of racism, and it
cannot be assumed that appearances will give way to underlying
, subtleties. Furthermore, a principle permitting such action could
not be easily controlled.266 Courts might demand that racially di£264. See notes 291-97 infra and accompanying text.
265. Remedies for racial imbalance frequently are not regarded as "compensatory"; but if members of only one race are allowed to transfer to a school with a
higher social clai.s level, there will obviously be a benefit for them and a disability
for those denied that choice. The notion of compensation is also implicit in other
remedies and in fields other than education.
266. See Bittker, supra note 14!l, at 1410-16.
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ferentiated treatment be "benign" or "benevolent," but neither
blacks nor other minorities would find protection from discrimination in those conclusory labels. Experience surely suggests that in
matters of race what seems benign one year may be exposed as
invidious the next. The application of so uncertain a standard could
well produce more racial imbalance rather than less, for as Professor
Bickel has observed:
. . . a benevolent quota, like token integration, may be grounded
in a realistic racism, which desires to continue as much compulsory
segregation as the authorities can be brought to tolerate. Very occasionally, the racist motive may be provable. For the most part, it
can only be surmised . . . : The immediate effect of the quota,
moreover, is the same no matter which motive animates it.267

Thus, the purposeful assignment of a Negro principal to a partially
Negro school may be intended either to provide psychological support for black students or to encourage a trend toward complete
segregation. A factual determination would entail consideration of
a great many variables, including teacher and parental attitudes,
which courts are ill-equipped to measure. When, in addition, the
economic and educational costs of integration are taken into account,268 the judicial task of deciding whether or not differential
treatment is "benevolent" assumes heroic proportions.
But the apprehension aroused by racially differentiated treatment of individuals does not rest simply on its susceptibility to misuse. A benevolent school quota of seventy whites to thirty blacks,
for example, is open to criticism, not only on the abstract ground
that in principle it is indistinguishable from tokenism, but also because it discriminates solely on the basis of color against both the
seventy-first white student and the thirty-first Negro student.269 To
the latter it will be small comfort that his exclusion from preferred
classrooms is expected to promote the long-range interests of other
Negroes.270 And the white child whose exclusion protects his race
against self-damaging concepts of superiority suffers much the same
injury. White children, it is true, have been found to be generally
267. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 62 (1962).
268. See notes 252 supra and 298 infra.
269. A flexible quota would pose essentially the same constitutional problem as a
rigid one, although its discriminatory qualities would be harder to detect.
270. "[I]t cannot be denied that in its objective operation, a benevolent quota is
as invidious as straight-out segregation. The difference in immediate effect is that
some Negroes will not be denied their freedom to associate. But most Negroes will
be, and the others will be allowed to associate only on the basis of special arrange•
ments that proclaim their apartness and hence inferiority." A. BICKEL, supra note 267,
at 61.
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less sensitive than Negroes to variations in the school quality, and
their performance may tend to be less affected by changes in social
class level.271 But to assert that this is usually so does not gainsay that
in particular cases a white child will be just as responsive to school
conditions as a Negro child. If he is nevertheless excluded, it is because of factors which are common to his race, but neither uniquely
nor universally applicable to it.272 This kind of disability, imposed
on the basis of racial generalizations, is at odds with the Court's repeated emphasis on the "personal and present" nature of equal protection rights273 and inconsistent with most of the case law from
Buchanan v. T:Varley 274 to Loving v. Virginia. 215
Moreover, it is not clear that the government's previous involvement in discriminatory practices, or the educational needs resulting
from those practices, can justify othenvise invalid racial disqualifications. Legislation based on personal need has a long history which
plainly establishes the constitutionality of compensatory training for
the disadvantaged. But special treatment of a racial class, drawn to
include individuals of diverse need and to exclude others of equal
need, is quite another matter. If compensation is allotted on the
basis of race, middle class blacks who have escaped at least some of
the ravages of discrimination will share in limited remedial resources,
and they will do so at the cost of diminished aid to the poor. On the
other hand, underprivileged nonblacks who may have been injured
in substantially similar ways270 will be denied benefits which persons
271. COLE!l!AN REPORT 297; CoM!IIISSION REPORT 84-86.
272. The predicament of Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans, who do not
qualify racially for preferences accorded to Negroes but have similar educational
needs, dramatically illustrates a major defect of this type of classification. The defect
might be ameliorated by treating members of these groups as "Negroes." But what
would be the justification for failing to treat lower class "whites" tlie same way? The
condition of not sharing one's disabilities with other members of a readily identifiable
class scarcely seems a suitable basis for unfavorable governmental treatment. But see
text accompanying notes 158-69 supra.
273. "[P]etitioner's right [to attend a state law school] was a personal one. It was
as an individual that he was entitled to the equal protection of the laws • • • ."
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938). To the same effect see
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Ok.la., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1941). Although this rule was developed during the decline of the separate but equal doctrine, it continues to be applicable in the post-Brown era. Watson v. City of Memphis,
373 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1963).
274. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
275. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). For a use of numerical ratios which do not require racially
differentiated treatment of individuals, see United States v. Montgomery County Bd.
of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969); notes 227-38 supra and accompanying text.
276. "[T]hough, with respect to the Negro member of [the] underclass, it is relatively easy to isolate specific types of deprivation at the hands of society and thereby
explain their present status, the chances are that if we examine all the other mem-
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of the same means, but of a different color, are accorded. Under the
theory relying on prior governmental discrimination, the validity of
corrective racial differentiation would apparently vary with the state's
antecedent race policies. In a mobile society in which bigotry has not
been uniform, this rule would be bound to produce anomalous results.277 But more fundamentally, the government's past involvement
in discriminatory practices is simply not relevant to the claim of the
individual who is prejudiced by differential treatment and who was
not himself implicated in the previous wrongdoing, save in the collective sense in which we are all morally responsible for permitting
official discrimination to permeate our society.278
Finally, it has been urged that the "most important" objection
to this type of classification is that it "weakens the government as
an educative force." 279 It has taken the better part of half a century
to establish the requirements of equality that characterize the race
relations cases. In voting, 280 education,281 job opportunity,282 housing,283 and other areas284 the Court has repeatedly invoked the principle that difference~_in ra_c:e__clo not warrant differences in official
treatmentoCinclividuals. A decision upholding a benevolent quota
would undermine that principle in both the public and the private
bers, we will find that each of them, in one way or another, has somehow been in•
jured by our society." Kaplan, supra note 263, at 374.
277. Often the minority group members most in need of preferential treatment
are those who were forced to move from a state which practiced severe discrimination
to one which did not. Furthermore, anomalous results cannot be avoided by charging
discriminatory practices to the national government, for the local effects of federal
discrimination vary as much as local practices.
278. Analogies have been drawn to the special treatment of women and to the
disestablishment of company-dominated labor unions, See P. FREUND, ON LAw AND
JUSTICE 46 (1968); Kaplan, supra note 263, at 365, But in those situations the classifying trait was racially neutral. Women often can be treated differently from men in
circumstances in which Negroes and whites must be treated alike. See, e.g., Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), upholding a provision limiting jury service by women to
volunteer registrants, Similarly the disenfranchisement of members of a company•
dominated union is quite different from the disenfranchisement or other differential
treatment of a racial group.
In any event, it is interesting to note that the current emphasis on black pride
and independence seems to have aroused Negro opposition to racial preferences. A
recent survey found that blacks, "by an overwhelming 84-10 per cent, reject the idea
of preferential treatment ••• in reparation for past injustices," NEWSWEEK, June 30,
1969, at 20.
279. Kaplan, supra note 263, at 379.
280. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
281. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
282. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commn. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc,, 372 U.S.
714 (1963).
283. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
284. E.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963): Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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domain. 285 Such a decision would imply that there are important
differences between the races, apparent if not real, and that those
differences are sufficient to justify governmental action which perforce must be described as racially discriminatory. If this premise is
accepted in order that fair-minded officials may allocate more benefits to a racial minority than it now receives, will there be any
principled basis on which to prevent future officials from allocating
fewer benefits to such a group? A quota which aids a particular
minority today may handicap that minority when its members become successful in disproportionate numbers. 286 And even while the
quota remains "benevolent," it is likely to operate at the expense of
another group which has essentially the same needs. A system so
administered seems certain to be highly divisive and to dilute the
political strength of all minority groups by placing their interests
in sharp conflict.
Perhaps the risks inherent in racially differentiated treatment of
individuals would be justified if no other effective way could be
found to attack inequality. But other means, which can achieve as
much as benevolent quotas while risking less, are available to any
legislature that has the will to employ them. 287 Congress and the
states have broad power to correct the effects of past discrimination
through racially neutral legislation. The Voting Rights Act of
1965,288 for example, precludes certain states from using literacy
tests, however impartially administered, when those tests specially
burden Negroes because of separate and unequal education.289 This
legislation is racially neutral inasmuch as it relieves all citizens of
285. The loss of "educative force" may be less than has been supposed, when due
regard is given to the decisions which have already upheld racial distinctions. But it
seems fair to say that the educative impact would be greater here than it was in the
jury cases, in which racial classificatiort was less visible, or in the cases of federal discrimination, in which exceptional circumstances were pleaded.
286. See N. AnRAMS, FOREWORD TO EQUALITY ix (1965), for an illustration of a
quota that was used to restrict a successful ethnic minority.
287. A legislature which fails to make use of its present authority is unlikely to
apply a racial quota in the manner intended by its proponents. On the other hand,
many officials who are sympathetic to the demands of minority groups may utilize
benign quotas without case support. Accordingly, even if racially differentiated action
were deemed necessary, it might still be imprudent for the Supreme Court to
legitimate the practice formally. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246
(1944) (dissenting opinion), in which Justice Jackson noted the difference between
racial discrimination by the Executive, which he called "an incident," and its valida·
tion by the Court, which he said leaves a constitutional principle lying "about like a
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need."
288. 42 U.S.C. § I973b(c) (Supp. IV 1965-1968).
289. Gaston County v. United States, 895 U.S. 285 (1969).
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the literacy requirement, but it benefits primarily those who have
been subjected to discrimination in the past and who would continue to suffer under a rigorous literacy standard. The approach
taken in the Voting Rights Act is open to wide application. State
universities, for instance, can admit on a nonracial basis students
who, because of previous disadvantages, do not qualify under the
existing admissions requirements; and public employers can adopt
analogous hiring practices.200 In circumstances in which preferences
are necessary to remedy existing inequalities, differential treatment
can be based directly on need. Corrective action which meets the
needs of black people, while also responding to the fact that those
needs are shared by nonblacks, will be less divisive than racial quotas
and far less vulnerable to misuse. At the same time, a compensatory
policy which embraces all persons similarly situated will be more
likely to gain political support and less likely to be judged paternalistic by its beneficiaries.
The other two categories of corrective action mentioned earlier
require only brief comment. One group of remedies disregards the
race of individuals and deals with neighborhoods instead. This
approach, which has the debatable advantage of obscuring the government's policy to classify racially, can be implemented by site selection, rezoning, and selective bussing.291 In each case it is possible
to formulate a program of neighborhood classification which in
effect constitutes a pure subterfuge. For example, transforming community boundaries from a geographical square to "an uncouth
twenty-eight-sided figure" 292 may be tantamount to differential treat290. Difficult questions can be raised concerning the wisdom of these policies in
specific situations. Such questions belong, however, in the political rather than the
constitutional sphere.
In Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), the Court had no occasion
to consider whether Congress could abolish literacy tests for persons who received
separate, unequal education and still retain such tests for other citizens. A classification of that kind would be underinclusive, since it would not reach persons poorlj
educated in nonseparate schools. But for the same reason, the classification is not
precisely racial-all persons attending nonseparate schools would be treated alike. A
classification reaching persons who have been "subjected to racial discrimination"
would avoid some of the constitutional barriers to racially differentiated treatment,
but it might invite the same political repercussions and would be difficult to administer.
291. The effectiveness of these measures has been explored elsewhere. See Fiss,
supra note 263, at 570-74. Some remedies, such as site selection and the pairing of
imbalanced schools, are helpful in small communities but not in metropolitan areas
where the problem is most acute; other measures depend, perhaps unrealistically, on
the und:erutilization of racially balanced schools or on student and parental initiative.
Bussing and rezoning which sacrifice geographic compactness create strong resistance
and may result in the withdrawal of white students to private or suburban schools.
292. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
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ment of individuals, and hence may raise the same issues as the first
group of remedies. The challenging question is whether, such extreme cases aside, it is permissible to select neighborhoods for assignment to a given school district on the basis of their racial composition.203 Supreme Court decisions do not indicate a difference of
constitutional dimensions between neighborhood and individual
classification by race. Yet, to many observers, differential treatment
seems to be less offensive when it embodies judgments in gross.
Racial classification of neighborhoods would call for like treatment
of all people within a given geographical area and would not involve
courts in the obnoxious business of determining a person's race.
Moreover, it may be impossible in many areas to eliminate racial
imbalance without some classification of this kind, and consequently
future cases may conceivably yield to that pressure.
The last group of remedies does not involve racial classification
of either neighborhoods or individuals within a school system. Under
these remedies, integration is produced by establ'ishing central schools
that draw students from all neighborhoods within the system or else
the racial distribution of students is altered by voluntary transfers,
random assignments, open enrollment, or free choice plans.294 These
corrective measures classify by race· in the sense that a purpose of the
state's action is to affect the racial composition of schools. But if, as
suggested above, integration is a legitimate governmental goal, 295
remedies of this kind seem constitutionally unassailable.
Thus, some remedies for racial imbalance will not encounter any
decisive legal barrier,296 although they will be subject to political
293. The distinction between gerrymandering which produces a twenty-eight-sided
figure and gerrymandering which yields a compact geographic unit is subtle. Presumably the latter serves interests other than integration, and it has the appearance of
being less arbitrary. In any case, segregated housing patterns may make neighborhood
classification seem qualitatively similar to individual classification.
294. Some plans to consolidate a range of grade levels on a central campus, called
an educational park or plaza, have also proposed that students be drawn from adjacent school districts. See Fischer, The School Park, in COMMISSION REPORT, app. D-2,
at 253-60. Although there are conceptual similarities between redefining the boundaries of a school system and rezoning neighborhoods within tl1e system, the educational park may properly be included in the last group of remedies. Establishment
of the park is certain to involve nonracial considerations which insulate against
discrimination, and it is far removed from racially differentiated treatment of individuals. Whereas racial considerations are often paramount in rezoning neighborhoods, they are submerged in the concept of educational parks.
295. See notes 241-62 supra and accompanying text.
296. These remedies would, of course, impinge on the student's freedom of association, as would any effort to alter the composition of the schools. But the School
Segregation Cases show that there is no general right to avoid undesired contacts in
public schools, and it has never been thought that the neighborhood school policy is
unconstitutional because it forces children in a common zone to attend classes to-
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limitations, as well as to limitations in effectiveness and economic
resources. There is reason to doubt that the political processes could
operate at the present time to impose a school program which a substantial majority of the community believed would disadvantage
their children. There is even greater reason to doubt that such a
program could succeed, if adopted. The plan for integration that
seems most likely to win essential public support is not one which
calls for sacrifice by some groups for the benefit of others, however
much that may comport with one's sense of justice in particular circumstances, but rather one which visibly operates to the mutual
benefit of all groups.297 A plan of the latter description is likely to engage no constitutional difficulty.
C. Black Separatism As a Means to Educational Equality

The discussion to this point has concentrated on attempts to
achieve racial balance and thereby to promote equal opportunity in
the schools. But integration is at best a slow and partial answer to
the problem of unequal education. Even the most conscientious
efforts to integrate the schools will fail for some years to reach many
of the children in urban ghettos. Furthermore, integration will involve transitional problems of academic and social adjustment; and
most significantly, it is sometimes perceived by Negroes as an expression of white superiority, as a threat to black cultural heritage, and
as a drain on the resources of the Negro community.298 Other approaches to educational equality have therefore been explored. The
new militancy, which represents a growing segment of Negro
thought, but should not be mistaken for its entirety, urges for the
present time a policy of black control of black institutions.
Although in the field of education, as elsewhere, proposals for
what may loosely be called "black separatism"299 have been wideranging, there is a core of illustrative specifics on which attention
can be focused. These include demands for all-Negro dormitories
and "autonomous" black studies programs at the college level, and
gether. It is difficult therefore to maintain that associational guarantees forbid the
purposeful inclusion of "non-neighbors" in particular schools.
297. Assuming its economic and educational feasibility, the educational park might
meet this standard. The park not only would provide integration, but it would offer
to all students advantages of technology, specialized curriculum, counseling, and other
services which no single school could afford.
298. See s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 260, at 53-55.
299. The term is used here merely as a convenient way to describe a collection of
diverse programs. Some Negroes may prefer the term "black nationalism," and others
may endorse specific policies but reject both terms.
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for Negro principals and, more generally, black control of black
community schools at pre-college levels. Since there has been no reported case involving these programs and little experience with their
operation, it is hazardous to predict how the Court will deal with
them. But black separatism raises such urgent issues-ones which
lower courts will soon face-that at least a preliminary analysis,
based on decisions concerning other racial classifications, should be
offered.
Because proposals for separatism have been associated with the
black power movement, and because of the emotion aroused by that
movement, the purposes of this kind of segregation are often misunderstood. Unlike traditional caste segregation, black separatism
does not appear to have as its goal the subjugation of racial classes,
although its treatment of individuals, as distinguished from groups,
sometimes bears painful similarity to the discriminatory treatment of Negroes. The immediate aim of black separatism is said to
be the elimination of social practices which operate as subtle instruments of white racism. In the primary and secondary schools the
emphasis has been on decentralization and community control. The
main objectives evidently are (1) to secure parent involvement in
the operation of the schools; 800 (2) to make the educational system
accountable and responsive to the community through the local
election of administrators and governing boards; (3) to support the
self-image of black students by hiring black personnel, especially
black principals; and (4) to control curriculum, academic standards,
and the selection of instructional materials as a means of assuring
suitable treatment of subjects such as Negro history and Afro-American culture.301 The themes that run throughout these proposals
and the demands for black studies and segregated dormitories are
the promotion of black pride and group solidarity, the accountability
of schools, and greater responsiveness to black needs. Control of educational institutions, some advocates believe, will meet the threat to
the black cultural heritage and to the manpower resources of the
ghetto. It may also stimulate other political activities in the black
community, leading to control over welfare, health, and law enforce300. This new responsibility may have favorable effects on parents themselves and
will provide them with experience which they can apply in other areas. If a sense of
control is also transmitted to the child, it may improve his ability to learn, since the
CoLEMAN REPORT found that the feeling of control over environment is highly related to the scholastic achievement of minority groups. COLEMAN REPORT 23. Con•
versely, programs which are imposed from outside and which are not supported by
parents may increase alienation in the black community rather than reduce it,
301. For a detailed account of these objectives see Hamilton, supra note 261.
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ment services. Finally, there is often a suggestion, sometimes implicit
and sometimes explicit, that when the black community has achieved
appropriate economic and political power it can consider policies of
meaningful integration on a basis of parity with the white community.
Insofar as the proposed educational reforms involve only a reallocation of existing state power, they encounter no serious difficulty
under the Federal Constitution. There may well be some constitutional restrictions against a redistribution of authority which is
clearly designed to effectuate an impermissible purpose, such as preventing compliance with a court order to desegregate.302 But state
discretion in apportioning responsibility among various government
agencies is extremely broad. In fact, decentralization of schools in
metropolitan areas is no different, constitutionally, from the local
control which is currently exercised by suburban school boards
throughout the country. Absent evidence of an unconstitutional objective, which has not been apparent here, the states may decide for
themselves whether to govern the schools through a citywide board
of education or through a number of smaller boards. For the same
reasons, a university can choose to exercise authority through selfregulating departments rather than through a more centralized
office.sos
A constitutional problem emerges, however, when demands are
made for the adoption of policies of racial segregation and discrimination rather than for changes in governing structure. Racially
separate dormitories and all-Negro departments of black studies may
serve some of the psychological and cultural ends already described.
The segregated dormitory also responds to the sense of isolation
which black students may experience in a university environment.
Some of these students feel that predominantly white dormitories
are hostile and inappropriate living quarters. 304 Similarly, the
presence of white students or teachers in black studies classrooms is
said to cause embarrassment when sensitive topics, such as family
patterns in the ghetto or crime and illegitimacy rates, are discussed.3015 It is often felt that a Negro teacher will have a better
302. Cf. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
303. Autonomy may also be granted to some departments-as the American Association of Law Schools asks for its member schools-whether or not it is granted to
others. A black studies faculty can be given special autonomy as long as the decision
to do so is based on reasonable criteria.
304. See Dunbar, The Black Studies Thing, N.Y. Times, April 6, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 25.
305. Id.
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understanding of ghetto life and will be better able to relate to it.306
At any rate, if a class believes that this is so, the learning process
may be affected, since student confidence is vital to the success of a
teacher. Thus, the articulated aims of black separatism are important
and challenging even when they entail racial separation.
But in spite of these important aims, the cases on racial classification suggest an uneasy constitutional future for governmental programs of this nature. 307 The difficulties begin with the school
decisions. The Court clearly stated in Bolling v. Sharpe that "[s]egregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective ...." 808 Taken at face value, that statement
could consign official policies of black separatism to an immediate
demise. Yet it seems hard to justify such a statement in view of the
objectives of black separatism outlined above. Few would deny the
propriety of those objectives, and it is far from self-evident that
racial separation is unrelated to them. Perhaps the Bolling statement,
which had questionable validity even in the context in which it was
announced, should be re-examined in light of the constitutional test
announced in l\fcLaughlin v. Florida.800 The Court in that case
found that racial classifications cannot be upheld unless they are
necessary, rather than merely related, to an overriding legislative
purpose.310 Under that analysis the racial exclusions at issue in
Bolling would fall because they served no "overriding" purpose,
but it might be argued that black separatism serves different interests
and should be permitted.
Nevertheless, even assuming McLaughlin is controlling, the
Court may still strike down official policies of Negro-inspired segregation. First, it will be difficult to show that segregation is necessary
to achieve the goals of black separatism. Other ways can probably be
found to support psychological and cultural needs and to assure a
classroom atmosphere conducive to learning. Second, McLaughlin
requires that the purpose of a racial classification be overriding in
relation to the harm "incurred by the affected private parties."811
306. Cf. K. CLAIUC, DARK GHETIO 132-37 (1965).
307. In order to stay within manageable limits, the discussion here will concentrate on the cases most likely to be deemed controlling. For one pertinent line of
decisions see text accompanying note 126 supra, suggesting a pointed analogy between
the rationale of some federal Indian case law and the determination of blacks to preserve their cultural heritage. But see text accompanying notes 142-43 supra.
308. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
309. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). See note 189 supra and accompanying text.
310. 379 U.S. at 192.
311. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1067, 1103
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The focus in this connection is on the objections to separatism that
might be raised by blacks who favor integration, by whites, and by
members of nonblack minorities.
A Negro 1s racial affinity to the group demanding separation will
not, of course, preclude his attack on black separation.312 Nor should
it be assumed that because the new segregation is Negro-inspired it
commands universal support within the Negro community. A number of blacks have already taken a strong public position against
separatism. The views of Dr. Kenneth Clark bear lengthy quotation,
since they are representative of this body of opinion:
Within the past two years another formidable and insidious
barrier in the way of the movement towards effective, desegregated
public schools has emerged in the form of the black power movement and its demands for racial separatism . . . . These demands
are clearly a rejection of the goals of integrated education and a return to the pursuit of the myth of an efficient "separate but equal"or the pathetic wish for a separate and superior-racially-organized
system of education. One may view this current trend whereby some
Negroes themselves seem to be asking for a racially segregated system of education as a reflection of the frustration resulting from
white resistance to genuine desegregation of the public schools since
the Brown decision and as a reaction to the reality that the quality
of education in the de facto segregated Negro schools in the North
and the Negro schools in the South has steadily deteriorated under
the present system of white control.
In spite of these explanations, the demands for segregated schools
can be no more acceptable coming from Negroes than they are
coming from white segregationists. There is no reason to believe
and certainly there is no evidence to support the contention that
all-Negro schools, controlled by Negroes, will be any more efficient
in preparing American children to contribute constructively to the
realities of the present and future world. 313

The chief argument of black integrationists, then, is that racial
separation is educationally counter-productive. Because past dis(1969). It should be noted in applying McLaughlin that the segregative aspects of
black separatism seem generally to require racially differentiated treatment of individuals and may be subject to closer review than purposeful integration, which some•
times does not involve such treatment. See notes 234-37 supra and accompanying text.
312. Whites were allowed to object to anti-miscegenation and cohabitation laws,
notwithstanding their participation in the political processes that produced those
laws, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964),
and blacks will likewise be heard on the issue of separatism.
313. Alternative Public School Systems, 38 HARV. Eouc. REV. 100, 103-04 (1968).
Similar views have been expressed by Roy Wilkins and Bayard Rustin. See N.Y. Times,
Jan. 14, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 7; N.Y. Times, April 28, 1969, § 1, at 17, col. 6.
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crimination has subjected large numbers of Negroes to economic
disadvantage, racial isolation at the present time would result in
social class isolation, and so lead to the educational detriment described in the Coleman Report.314 There is a serious danger, moreover, that Negro demands for separatism may be manipulated by
white supremacists to maintain their own brand of segregation. Indeed, the judicial task of determining the real source of segregationist preferences-black nationalism or the color caste systemseems insurmountable. The underlying premise of black separatism,
that minorities can secure official segregation but the majority cannot, is equally perilous. On that basis whites who constitute a minority in their local area could demand segregated facilities, while apparently Negroes could not. 315 Some blacks may therefore contend
that separatism has the potential to become an unconscious ally of
white supremacy, an ally scarcely less invidious for being advocated
by the most militant of Negroes.316
White students may also object to racially differentiated treatment, whether in black studies programs or in segregated dormitories. Their exclusion from black studies on grounds unrelated to
academic qualification involves obvious disadvantages; whites, like
blacks, may be interested in Negro history or in studying under
Negro teachers. But even when dual facilities are "equal," as in the
case of segregated dormitories, white students may challenge their
differential treatment.317 As Professor Wechsler has pointed out,
whites as well as blacks suffer from racial segregation, although in
314. Brown v. Board of Educ. was sweeping in its appraisal of the effect of gov•
emment-enforced separation: "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (emphasis added). The hope of black separatism fa that segrega•
tion will not inflict permanent damage when it is sought by the minority rather than
prescribed by the majority, and that the consequences of racial isolation may be
attenuated at the college level, But see N.Y. Times, May 23, 1969, § 1, at 29, col. 6, in
which Dr. Clark rejects the notion that "exclusion on the basis of race is any less
damaging when demanded or enforced by the previous victims than when imposed
by the dominant group.'' For a case applying the Brown theory of inherent inequality to a state university, see Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350
U.S. 413 (1956) (per curiam).
315. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964), striking down a racial classifica,
tion which would prejudice whichever race was in the local minority. It is well to
recall that in many regions where Negroes are presently a minority they will probably
compose a majority in the foreseeable future.
316. The arguments of the black integrationist cannot be met merely by allowing
him to withdraw from an all-Negro black studies program. He may properly object
to being forced to choose between segregation and the relinquishment of desired
academic courses. Furthermore, official sponsorship of separate programs for Negroes
could combine with pressures from fellow students to make his choice more illusory
than free.
317. Cf. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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different ways and for different reasons. 318 Hence a southern white
should be free to object, for example, to his exclusion from the back
of a state-operated bus or, in the case at hand, from a "Negro school"
or a "Negro dormitory." The Supreme Court has in fact already permitted members of both races to challenge the racial segregation of
public records, 319 despite the apparent "equality" of treatment.820
Finally, the case for nonexclusion of other minorities is perhaps
the easiest to make. Their claims against discrimination by Negroes
are strikingly similar to the claims which Negroes have legitimately
made against discrimination by whites. Mexican-Americans, Indians,
and Orientals may properly urge that in an all-Negro black studies
department they are denied equality by a racial class which is larger
and politically more powerful than themselves. It is difficult to
see how courts could justify these exclusions while still holding, as
they should, that whites cannot exclude blacks from governmentsponsored activities.
But even if the Constitution restricts official enforcement of
Negro-inspired segregation, it will not foreclose the implementation
of black separatist programs. Those programs can be advanced in
much the same way that inequality is thrust upon N egroes--through
private or "fortuitous" black separatism. The neighborhood school
plan, which has relegated Negro children to segregated education by
racially neutral criteria, can be employed by blacks for community
control systems which are equally neutral as to race. Simila<y, the
general immunity of private organizations to constitutional restraints
can protect not only the local country club, but also black action
groups which can work effectively for black pride and solidarity
without official sponsorship. It will even be possible to achieve a
large degree of racial separation, if that is found to be desirable.321
318. Wechsler, supra note 38, at 34. Both groups will suffer more if, as the Civil
Rights Commission found, segregation operates to reinforce mutual fears and hostilities.
319. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam). See text accompan;ing
notes 217-19 supra.
320. The objections of qualified white teachers and principals to racial restrictions
on job opportunity require no commentary. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commn.
v. Continental Air Lines, In.:., 372 U.S. 714, 721 (1963), observing that "any state or
federal law requiring applicants for any job to be turned away because of their color
would be invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."
321. The wisdom of separatist policies, as distinguished from their constitutionality, is not considered here. For a current discussion of nonlegal issues, see Lewis,
The Road to the Top Is Through Higher Education-Not Black Studies, N.Y. Times,
May 11, 1969. § 6 (Magazine), at 34, which raises questions as to whether separatism
can prepare blacks for the best jobs and whether whites are not more in need of
black studies than are Negroes.
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Assuming no governmental involvement, students are probably free
to segregate themselves in dormitories or college classes by the exercise of genuine free choice. 322 Separation might also result from state
action which does not classify racially. For example, students in some
black studies courses might be selected on the basis of their previous
exposure to ghetto life or other special qualifications.323
Given the limits of present knowledge, courts will probably
hesitate to take a rigid attitude toward any tenable means of promoting racial equality. Conceivably some degree of self-imposed
separation may ultimately facilitate integration. Black power advocates have emphasized that "[bJefore a group can enter the open
society, it must first close ranks." 324 This statement seems to imply
that after Negroes have developed their own strengths, and after
cultural diversity has been accepted in a positive way and not as an
obstruction to "assimilation," it will be possible for those so desiring
to enter an integrated society. Viewed in those terms, black separatism-the closing of ranks--may become compatible rather than
inconsistent with long-term integration. But unlike a number of
plans for early integration, black separatism carries an inevitable
risk of reinforcing traditional segregation patterns. Accordingly, separatist solutions, even when constitutionally permissible, will be approached by the courts with extreme caution.
X.

CONCLUSION

It seems clear that the state and federal governments have broad
power to answer the educational needs of black people and of
disadvantaged members of other groups, and in order to do so they
appear to have some power to classify by race. But the Supreme
Court has not articulated a clear neutral standard by which to
measure the limits of permissible racial classification. In view of
past experience with governmental use of racial criteria, it is understandable that the Court should act with great precaution, even
though this sometimes leads to results which are inadequately ex322. "There is a vast difference-a Constitutional difference-between restrictions
imposed by the state which prohibit the intellectual co-mingling of students, and the
refusal of individuals to co-mingle where the state puts no such bar." McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
323. This is substantially the position taken by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in enforcing title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. N.Y.
Times, May 3, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 7. Close vigilance will be required if "special
qualifications" are not to be used as a subterfuge for racial disabilities.
32·1. s. CARMICHAEL 8: C. HAMILTON, supra note 260, at 44 (italics omitted).
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plained or which are not explained at all. 325 But if the tendency
toward unexplained results is understandable in terms of preserving
judicial options, it should also be recognized that the failure to explain, and thereby confine, can be even more threatening than fully
reasoned authority permitting racial considerations. At any rate, in
developing more precise standards and in responding to specific
issues, reliance must be placed upon a close analysis of the racial
classifications which have already been presented to the Court.
325. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225
(1969); Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam). Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202 (1965), illustrates the carefully considered opinion which tries at times to conceal
more than it reveals about permissible classification by race. See note 179 supra.

